



## Diaspora and development cooperation.

A study about the role of the Antwerp diaspora from Congo, Ghana and Morocco in development cooperation and cooperation with the city of Antwerp.



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# 1. Introduction

A city like Antwerp is not an island. It is part of a global society and was able to grow thanks to its international contacts. The international port of Antwerp has always been a great attraction and a gateway to faraway countries and foreign cultures. About 102 399 foreigners live in the city and according to some sources, 167 nationalities have been registered there (Buurtmonitor of the city of Antwerp, 2013). Most of them stay in contact with family in their country of origin. They do this not just by visiting, emailing or calling the country of origin, but also by providing the essential support of a large group. The scope of the latter has hardly been investigated in Belgium. However, experience in the city has taught us that this form of support is closely related to development cooperation. Cooperation with organisations of ethnic minorities who take initiatives in their country of origin benefits both the city and the migrant communities.

Traditionally, the diaspora has provided financial and material support to family and friends by sending money and goods. These transfers have increased enormously over the past few years. And although most of these remittances are meant to support family and friends in their daily lives, businesses or emergencies resulting from disease and drought, for example, national and international policymakers' interest in such transfers has grown considerably both in the North and in the South over the past few years. According to the World Bank reports, the total global amount of remittances exceeds that of official development aid or foreign investment in the South. Opinions about its impact and development relevance are divided. Some international institutions and policymakers are only too pleased to consider them as an additional form of development cooperation. Others warn us not to overestimate their significance. The transferred money and goods usually focus on family and are mainly used for private purposes.

The people of the diaspora are increasingly more aware of the opportunities they have to do something for their country of origin. They are an important source of income to family members in the country of origin. As mentioned above, this source of income exceeds official development aid or foreign investment. Over the past few years, we have also seen an evolution from family solidarity to development aid and development cooperation in the region and country of origin. Within the various migrant communities, more and more networks and organisations are being established to provide organised help to the country of origin. Most of these are what Flemish development cooperation organisations refer to as fourth pillar organisations. A growing number of these have now also found their way to advisory bodies, funds and government subsidies.

The aim of this study is to gain an understanding of the role organisations of ethnic minorities in Antwerp play in development cooperation. To do so, our focus is not on the impact of their development work in the country of origin, but we do want to understand the group engaged in this topic within the diaspora in Antwerp. We examine whether the persons in this group are typical representatives of the fourth pillar. We provide an outline of their profile, we examine which motives support their commitment, how they are organised, which approach they take, what they consider development cooperation to be and what the impact is on their own lives and by extension, (their integration into) society here.

This study is a practical, empirical survey and its main objective is to arrive at preliminary policy recommendations. In particular, the survey wants to make suggestions for the local development cooperation policy and the relevant areas of the integration and social cohesion policy of the city of Antwerp.

This study examines three communities in greater detail: Congolese, Ghanaian and Moroccan diaspora organisations in the city of Antwerp. In 2007, the city of Antwerp chose to focus its development policy on countries that have substantial communities in Antwerp. The Congolese, Moroccan and Ghanaian communities are most prevalent in the city.

#### Migration to Belgium

Today, Belgium is a mosaic of nationalities, most of which are still European (France, Netherlands and Poland are the top three immigration countries). Migrants of African origin make up about 20% of all people with a foreign nationality. In total, slightly less than 10% of the population has a foreign nationality. The city of Antwerp has 511 716 inhabitants, 102 399 of which have a foreign nationality. This is 20% of the population. This group can be divided into no fewer than 167 nationalities, of which the Netherlands (17.18%), Morocco (16.35%), Poland (6.06%) and Turkey (5.92 %) are the most important ones. The low-to-medium-income countries with the highest presence are Morocco, China, India, Congo and Ghana.

The biggest influx of migrants into Belgium occurred through free movement (54.6% in 2008) or migration out of choice. The next main reason to come to this country is family (32.7%). In Belgium, employment (7.8%) and humanitarian motives (4.9%) are less common reasons for migration.

## 2. Migration and development

### 2.1 The three stages of thinking about migration and development

Despite the growing enthusiasm of policymakers and researchers about the role migrants can play in development cooperation, the discourse on the relationship between migration and development has not always been equally optimistic. For several decades now, migration has been linked to development, poverty and inequality, either as a consequence of underdevelopment in an emigration region, or as the cause of or impediment to increased development. Traditionally, three stages are distinguished (Faist, 2008 and Schiller, 2011 and de Haas, 2010a).

#### 2.1.1 Stage 1: Migration and development: remittances and returns

From the neoclassical perspective of the 1950s and 60s, migration was considered as something positive for both the host country and the country of origin the migrants left behind. For a long time, immigration countries in the North pursued an active policy to attract temporary migrants to fill certain gaps in the labour market. Money and goods transfers (remittances), economic investments by migrants in their country of origin and the transfer of human capital upon their return were thought to have a positive impact on the economic development in the South.

#### 2.1.2 Stage 2: Migration and underdevelopment: poverty and brain drain

The end of the 1960s saw the rise of a more pessimistic view on the impact of migration on poverty, inequality and economic development in the countries of origin. Migration would lead to a shortage of the necessary labour and a shortage of highly educated employees from the South (brain drain). This brain drain argument became even more popular in the 1970s and 80s, when immigration countries closed their doors to low-skilled labour migrants and only allowed highly educated migrants in. The fact that many of these highly educated individuals worked in jobs that were below the level of their skills or qualifications invalidates the argument that migrants bring back increased human capital when they return to their country of origin (Wets et al., 2004).

The **Ghanaian community** in Belgium officially consists of 3 141 people. Mainly in the early 1990s, many Ghanaians applied for asylum in Belgium.

Another objection is that money transfers and investments focus too much on family and do not benefit the public interest. It was also found that the majority of these remittances were used for consumption of Western goods rather than local products.

**Congolese migration** to Belgium happened in different stages. In the 1960s, mainly Congolese students came to Belgium with a government grant. Many of them returned to Congo after their studies. In the 1970s and 80s, even more students went to Belgium to study, but many of them did not have the intention of going back. Some wanted to escape poverty, others applied for political asylum in order to flee the Mobutu regime. In the 1990s, even more Congolese applied for political asylum. Today, studies and politics are still the main reasons for migration. Family reunification is also an important motive. Ever since the start of the new millennium, there have been more and more family reunifications with the migrants' parents who had been left behind. According to the population registers, there were 18 056 persons of Congolese nationality in Belgium on 1 January 2010.

### 2.1.3 Stage 3: Migration and co-development: transnational circulation

Since 1990, studies on transnationalism, new economics of labour migration and the livelihood approaches resulted in a pluralistic and rather optimistic vision underlining the heterogeneous, reciprocal character of the relationship between migration and development (de Haas, 2010a). Contrary to the neoclassical perspective, which only focused on money and goods transfers and return migration, since 1990 attention shifted to transnational development, social remittances and the contribution those remittances can make to the creation of structural forms of social protection for the families, friends or communities in the country of origin. Migration is seen as a circular process rather than a one-way action that stops when the immigrant arrives in the new country. Globalisation connects people, places and social environments (micro, meso & macro) in such a way that an event or policy decision in one place has an immediate effect on another place (Appanduari, 1997). Migrants remain individuals who are geographically, socially and culturally mobile. They are diasporic brokers who transfer money and goods, investments, ideas, norms and values and trade practices through visits, temporary returns to the country of origin, social networks and other channels (Faist, 2008).

The impact of remittances, transnational development aid and development cooperation initiatives depends on the continuous complex interaction between socio-economic actions and aspirations of migrants and persons in the country of origin, the quality and efficiency of existing institutional structures in the country of origin, the size of the migrant communities in the immigration country and the resources they have available and socio-economic and political evolutions at a national and international level (Portes, 2011, 2010a & 2010b). Under optimal institutional, political and socio-economic conditions, development corridors (Zoomers and van Westen, 2011) may arise between the migrant communities in

Today, the **Moroccan community** is the biggest non-European community in Belgium. It is the fourth biggest immigration group in Belgium. According to the registry, a total 81 943 persons of Moroccan nationality lived in Belgium on 1 January 2010. The Moroccan consulates in Brussels, Antwerp and Liège estimate that the Moroccan community in Belgium consists of approximately 350 000 individuals. Thousands of migrant workers settled in Belgium in the 1960s and 70s and their families followed. Many Moroccan students also enrolled at Belgian universities. The statistics also include many refugees, mainly intellectuals who fled the regime of Hassan II.

the host country and communities or places in the country of origin. The repetitive exchange of people, goods, capital (social, cultural and economic), information and social remittances between both places, stimulates the development of the communities or places in the country of origin.

## 2.2 The policy's growing interest in migrants as development actors

### 2.2.1 Remittances transcend official development aid

Several reports have shown that the total amount of money transfers sent by migrants to family and friends in the country of origin through official

channels (such as banks and Western Union)<sup>1</sup> far exceeds the total net spending of so-called official development cooperation (Overseas Development Aid or ODA) from the OECD countries. These reports are the basis for growing enthusiasm in national and international policymakers and institutions to reveal migrants as major actors in development cooperation. In 2011 a total 351 billion dollars in remittances was sent. In that same year, 133.5 billion dollars was spent on development aid (World Bank, 2011).

### 2.2.2 Liberalisation and socialisation of development cooperation

The policy's growing interest fits in well with the liberal views on development cooperation. Since the Washington Consensus at the end of the 1980s, the Bretton Woods institutions (IMF and World Bank) and the donor countries have presented privatisation, decentralisation, ownership, bottom-up development and good governance as almost magical solutions for sustainable development of the South. The Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) severely restricted the role of the state in public and social services. The state had to provide the ideal market conditions with minimum political and legal structures and infrastructures and this would then lead to efficient social and economic development.

When at the end of the 1990s it became apparent that privatisation in the social and healthcare sectors failed to result in better and more accessible social services for the population, a new development model was promoted (Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers or PRSP). In addition to focusing on the market and central government, this model also gave civil society a crucial part in the South. Decentralisation and participation of civil society had to provide good governance, bottom-up development, ownership and empowerment. Local actors (local governments, interest groups, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), social movements) had to gain more autonomy in terms of political decision making and administration issues. However, decision-making participation never really materialised and was limited to superficial consultations with civil society and a shift of merely executive tasks to local actors. NGOs and community organisations

#### Remittances: It's not all about money!

**Remittances:** Migrants transfer money or goods to family in the country of origin, so that they can purchase basic goods, pay for healthcare and education and absorb possible changes in income. Even if the transfers are used to consume luxury goods, they have a multiplier effect. Studies have shown that the frequency and quantity of remittances fall as migrants stay in the immigration country for longer periods of time.

**Social remittances:** With their experience, knowledge, transnational contacts and social and political values and ideas, migrants make an important contribution to their countries of origin. Migrants may establish pressure groups in their country of origin or propagate values such as the right to quality healthcare and education in the South. Because migrants know the social, cultural, political and economic sensitivities in both the country of origin and the immigration country and they know how they can convey experiences, knowledge and values in an acceptable way, they sometimes act as real bridge builders.

Sources: De Bruyn, Develtere (2008), Cohen (2011), Golding et al (2010) and Levitt and Lamba (2011)

<sup>1</sup> This is an underestimate, as many migrants prefer to send the money and goods through informal channels or to take it with them when they visit their family in the country of origin. A survey performed by the World Bank in 2005 among the African diaspora in Belgium showed that 42% of money transfers to Senegal and 55% of transfers to the DR of Congo and Senegal are made through informal channels (World Bank (2006)).

filled the gaps in social services left by the market actors: water, sanitation, local infrastructure, basic healthcare, basic education ... (Mestrum, 2005 and De Meyer and Holvoet, 2005).

The emergency in various Western countries of local authorities and the fourth pillar as partners implementing development cooperation shows that the discourse

#### The four pillars of development cooperation

Traditionally, three types of actors were distinguished in the field of development cooperation: government, multilateral organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). In 2005 Develtere defined a fourth pillar of new actors to complement the three traditional pillars.

**First pillar:** government. The government has long had a monopoly on development cooperation. This cooperation is traditionally bilateral with governments in the South. In this country, the national, regional, provincial and local governments are involved. At the moment the following bodies exist at government level: Belgian Technical Cooperation (BTC) and Directorate-General for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid (DGD). In Flanders there are the Department of International Cooperation (DIV), the Flemish International Cooperation Agency (FICA) and the municipal and provincial North-South services.

**Second pillar:** multilateral organisations such as the European Commission's intergovernmental institutions (European Development Fund, ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, European Economic and Social Committee ...) and the United Nations (World Bank, UNDP, UNIFEC, World Health Organisation ...).

**Third pillar:** NGOs and universities. Most Belgian NGOs receive structural government support. NGOs also have their own resources resulting from gifts and fundraising. On a global scale, the budgets of some large NGOs (World Vision, Save the Children International, Plan International ...) exceed the total government budget available in Belgium for development cooperation. In many countries, NGOs forge alliances to have more of an impact on the government. In this country, for example, 11.11.11 is the political umbrella organisation of the Flemish North-South movement.

on decentralisation, socialisation and bottom up development also found acceptance (Develtere, 2005 and 2009 and Develtere and Stessens, De Bruyn and Huyse, 2009). The policymakers' recent attention for fourth pillar initiatives by the diaspora, collective money transfers and the entrepreneurial spirit of migrants fits in well with current liberal views on development cooperation (Faist, 2008 and Schiller, 2011).

#### 2.2.3 Development cooperation and integration

There is also a noticeable shift within the programmes organised by governments both in the North and the South to support migrants and/or organisations of ethnic minorities in their transnational activities. The first policy initiatives for such co-development originated in France in the 1970s and were picked up by policymakers in Italy, Spain and Belgium at the end of 1990s (Lacroix, 2009). They focused on stimulating and guiding the voluntary return of migrants and their reintegration in their home country. If migrants returned voluntarily, they received financial

**Fourth pillar:** heterogeneous group of non-traditional development actors that do not belong to any of the other three pillars. These initiatives are based on a different frame of reference (win-win, return on investment, personal solidarity ...) and implement their projects in their own way with their own methods (trust based on personal expertise and intense personal contact and interaction ...). They rely heavily on voluntary efforts and personal financing and donations. For a few years now, fourth pillar initiatives are more and more financed by separate government subsidies. It is estimated that there are between 1 379 and 6 400 initiatives in Flanders to which about 25 000 to 60 000 people are committed. The big players are: the missions, trade unions, farmers' organisations, schools, youth movements, businesses, national health services and hospitals, cooperatives and foundations. Initiatives by organisations of ethnic minorities are also categorised under the fourth pillar.

Sources: De Meyer and Holvoet (2005), Develtere (2005), Develtere (2009), De Bruyn & Huyse (2009), Meireman (2002), Develtere & Stessens (2007), Portes (2011).

support and guidance to set up a business project or trade in their home country.

Around the turn of the century, attention shifted from co-development programmes to the facilitation of migrants to contribute to their country of origin without having to return as such. Co-development programmes were increasingly considered to be a means to integrate certain communities better (Faist, 2008 and Schiller, 2011). This shift resulted from a changed view on the relationship between integration and the migrant's transnational identity and activities (Gowricharn, 2010). Policymakers have long considered focusing on the motherland as an indication of the poor integration of the migrants, the 'sixth migration myth' according to de Haas (2005). Actually, focusing on the country of origin can be an indication of integration, but this is not always the case. Transnationality and integration are fully compatible.

A number of local authorities (such as Paris, Milan, Barcelona and Madrid) explicitly link migration and development cooperation in their policies, as an alternative or complement to the regular integration policy (see also Fauser, 2011 and others). Thomas Lacroix (2010) refers to this as the development for integration approach. However, there are hardly any studies that show that commitment in development practices improves migrants' situation in terms of employment, education or the political and cultural field (individual integration) or affects perceptions in the host country (Gowricharn, 2010). In any case, a recent study by Perrin and Martiniello (2011) shows that migrants' transnational activities do not stand in the way of their integration and ties in the host country, on the contrary.

They see their double citizenship as an asset. By being active in the transnational space, they increase their symbolic capital and therefore strengthen their place in the host country. Lacroix' (2010) study also shows that commitment in development projects contributes to (and results from) the functional integration of migrants, for example through increased access to the public space. Development practices also prove instrumental to psychosocial integration. They promote the cohesion between migrants and (organisations of ethnic minorities) in the immigration country. They also help migrants to legitimise their place in their country of origin and help shape their multiple identities (Lacroix, 2010). Some people also indicate that integration is a prerequisite for transnationality. Social economic integration is also associated with an increased financial and cognitive capacity to invest in the country of origin, set up transnational businesses or contribute to the social debate. However, most studies qualify this and state that integration is not a necessary condition to set up transnational activities, as long as community duties are involved (digging wells, building roads, constructing or renovating religious buildings ...). Integration does appear to be crucial to more modern forms of development activities, because their execution is so much more complex. Integration is therefore not a condition of transnationality, but it does affect its form (Gowricharn, 2010 and Perrin and Martiniello, 2011).

## 2.3 Policy initiatives for migration and development

### 2.3.1 International

Ever since the World Bank (2003 and 2006) drew the attention of the international community to the potential of migrant money flows to countries of origin, the relationship between migration and development is taken more and more seriously by policymakers. In 2005, the European Commission issued a communication entitled *Migration and Development: Some Concrete Orientations* presenting proposals in terms of money transfers, labour and circular migration, combating brain drain and the migrants' involvement in development policy. One year later, the Global Commission of International Migration presented its report at the UN High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development, which hammered away at the need for more coherence between migration and development (GCIM, 2005). One of the important points of discussion was the question whether this High-Level Dialogue was to be continued at a global level as a forum. In the end, 78 countries supported the idea of a forum. The Global Migration Group would be able to ensure the coherence and coordination within the forum. However, opinions about the interpretation turned out to be divided in the European Union. Italy and Sweden argued that the forum should be part of the UN, whereas the Netherlands, Belgium and the United Kingdom felt that the forum should not be a UN body and that the UN's input could be provided by the Special Representative of the Secretary General at the Global Migration Group.

Belgium offered to organise the first meeting of the Global Forum on Migration and Development in 2007 about migration and socioeconomic development. Policymakers from 155 countries, representatives from about thirty international organisations and 200 civil society participants from 55 countries participated in this forum. Subsequent editions always focused on a different theme (see <http://www.gfmd.org/en/>):

- **Philippines 2008:** protection of migrants and human rights;
- **Greece 2009:** integration of migration in development strategies;
- **Mexico 2010:** partnerships for migration and development;
- **Switzerland 2011:** action in the field of coherence, capacity and cooperation;
- **Mauritius 2012:** strengthening migration's contribution to the development of migrants, communities and states.

There will be no forum in 2013, but there will be a new High-Level Dialogue that will evaluate the forum's first seven editions.

Today this forum is the biggest and most inclusive, multilateral policy process and the frame of reference about migration and development. Its added value mainly lies in dialogue and awareness of the relationship between migration and

development with policymakers and stakeholders in the North and the South. One of the indirect consequences of the forum is that it contributed to many African governments' interest in the diaspora's potential. Since the forum, ministries have sprung up in many African countries focusing on the diaspora (Frouws and Grimmus, 2012). One unique aspect of the forum is how governments and the civil society organisations involved cooperate in teams voluntarily. Because of the forum's independence from the UN, it can also put certain aspects on the agenda that would not be included otherwise, such as the relationship between migration and the economic crisis in 2009 (Omelaniuk, 2012). It must be noted, however, that although the forum has increased awareness of the relationship between migration and development, there have been no attempts as yet to develop a migration and development monitoring system with set goals and indicators (Chappell et al., 2011). Also, the forum has spawned few concrete recommendations. In the end the policy is mainly implemented on a regional and bilateral level rather than a global level.

The **European Union** integrated the relationship between migration and development in one of the three pillars of the Global Approach to Migration, which the union adopted in 2005 and reconfirmed in 2011.

This should result in a comprehensive framework that allows migration and mobility to be managed across various policy areas (development foreign and home affairs, social policy and employment) in a coherent and mutually beneficial way by means of policy dialogue and close practical cooperation in mobility partnerships with third-party countries (European Commission, 2011).

Other organisations playing an important part in the international dialogue on migration and development are the World Bank, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The publication of the Migration and Remittances Factbooks and the six-monthly Migration and Development Briefs by the World Bank's Migration and Remittances Unit have hugely increased the attention that is paid to the development potential of transfers. This has led to the establishment of special institutes in the North and the South to help migrants transfer the money as efficiently as possible through formal channels (such as Banque Populaire in Morocco, which has branches in several European countries including Belgium) and the development of websites ([www.geldnaarhuis.nl](http://www.geldnaarhuis.nl) and [www.sendmoneyhome.org](http://www.sendmoneyhome.org)) supported by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the British Department for International Development respectively. The World Bank also supports governments to collect data about remittances and to monitor the rates of 200 official channels for money transfers with the World Bank Remittance Price Database. In addition to financially supporting studies on migration and development, IOM finances projects for economic and community development in migration regions in the South, more efficient formal money transfers, knowledge transfer through returning migrants and the temporary return of experts and

capacity building of transnational migrant communities within the European Commission - United Nations Joint Migration and Development Initiative (JMDI). JMDI is an initiative that is subsidised by the European Commission and the United Nations and is implemented by UNDP, IOM, ILO, the UN refugee agency (UNHCR) and the UN population fund (UNFPA). JMDI was launched in 2008 with the aim to support migrant communities in their development cooperation projects in 16 target countries. JMDI provides guidance and financial support and spreads information on good practices through an online community. In 2009, € 10 million was budgeted to support transnational projects.

### 2.3.2 National

At the end of the 1990s, policymakers from various European countries discovered a link between development and migration and started to explore the possibilities of an integrated policy. Similar to France, Spain and Italy (Lacroix, 2009 and De Haas, 2006), Belgium first pursued policy initiatives that included migrants as actors in development cooperation aimed at encouraging and guiding the return of migrants (De Bruyn, 2010). In 1997, the Directorate-General for Development Cooperation (DGOS – now DGD) reserved a budget for a programme for the voluntary return and reintegration of illegal migrants or migrants whose applications were rejected.

The programme was outsourced to five NGOs. The Red Cross and the Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA) mainly handled the establishment of courses in Belgium. The Flemish Consultation Centre for the Integration of Refugees (Vlaamse Overleg Centrum Integratie van Vluchtelingen or OCIV), which is now called Flemish Refugee Action (Vluchtelingenwerk Vlaanderen), the Walloon coordination and initiatives agency for refugees and foreigners (Coordination et initiatives pour réfugiés et des étrangers) and the Women's Collective (Collectif des Femmes) also provided technical guidance and up to € 2 500 in financial support for the establishment of a small company in the country of origin (De Bruyn et al., 2008). Since 2000, the programmes were expanded to all migrants wishing to return in order to establish a company.

Due to the limited results in terms of the number of returning migrants, the programme was changed in 2002. DGD also saw that the development relevance and economic impact in the South was very small, which led it to gradually distance itself from the programme. An evaluation in 2005 reported on the establishment of 289 primarily one-man businesses under the programme (De Bruyn, 2010). DGD also felt that return as such was not within its scope.

In 2004 the programme transformed to Migration and Development and the focus shifted to allowing migrants to contribute to their country of origin without the obligation to return. Organisations of ethnic minorities rather than individual migrants became the programme's target group, with a strong emphasis on Congo and the Congolese diaspora. The Return Programme changed into a programme providing financial support (up to € 30 000 at CIRE and € 2 500 at OCIV) and

guidance from local NGOs in the South to socio-economic projects of organisations of ethnic minorities with a clear connection to the home region. Only YWCA supported other organisations of ethnic minorities than those from the Congolese diaspora. DGD also supported the Migration and Development Platform (Plate-Forme Migration et Développement) of the French-language umbrella organisation of development NGOs (CNCD), which aimed to bring together NGOs and migrants for dialogue on development and migration. Within multilateral cooperation, DGD started to offer financial support to IOM's MIDA Great Lakes programme for capacity building, which since 2001 has encouraged highly trained migrants from Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo to invest their knowledge, expertise and resources in the sustainable development of their country of origin. Government institutions, organisations or businesses from the Great Lakes area active in education, healthcare or rural development can contact

the MIDA Great Lakes programme to find an expert from the diaspora, who is then financially supported by the programme to go and work in the field for a certain period.

Although a federal 'Migration and Development' budget line still exists and Belgium makes every effort to have an impact on an international level in this regard (one example is the wish to organise the first Global Forum for Migration and Development in 2007), the current national policy on organisations of ethnic minorities contributing to development cooperation is rather limited. By 2007, DGD only supported the MIDA Great Lakes programme. In 2005, financial support to the CNCD Plate-Forme Migration et Développement was stopped. One of the reasons was that CNCD had decided to focus on other issues. The platform never succeeded to bring the NGOs and migrant communities closer together, but it did contribute to the establishment of the general migrants' coordination agency for development (Coordination Générale des Migrants pour le Développement or CGMD), a platform that promotes the participation of migrants in development cooperation. In 2006 the OCIV and CIRE programmes no longer received any financing. One of the reasons was that the organisations felt that the focus of the activities should be on refugees in the North. DGD did confirm its focus on Congo in 2007, when it decided to provide direct support to organisations of ethnic minorities, mainly the Benelux Afro Center and Cap Santé, as part of healthcare in Congo. The Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture Belgium – Luxembourg – Africa – Caribbean – Pacific established the Diaspora Unit to provide information to candidate entrepreneurs about various support agencies in Belgium and to help them create a good business plan (De Bruyn et al., 2008).

### 2.3.3 Regional

Compared to Flanders, the Walloon government included migrants and organisations of ethnic minorities in its development policy more explicitly for longer. This can be partly explained by the influence of the co-development

programme from neighbouring France and the active lobbying by organisations of ethnic minorities to engage in a dialogue with the other NGOs and government bodies. Since the late 1990s, the CNCD initiated debates between NGOs and migrants, which eventually led to the establishment of the Plate-Forme Migration et Développement. Finally the Walloon government also paid attention sooner to the so-called fourth pillar (see above). In 2003 already, it established a support unit for international Walloon support (Cellule d'Appui pour la Solidarité Internationale Wallone or CASIW) to guide civil society actors such as groups of friends, citizens, sports organisations, organisations of ethnic minorities and religious organisations to set up development cooperation projects (De Bruyn, 2010). Although CASIW is open to all fourth pillar initiatives, it seems to be mainly approached by organisations of ethnic minorities (De Bruyn et al., 2008).

The Flemish government also pursues its own policy for development cooperation with the Flemish International Cooperation Agency or FICA (Vlaams Agentschap voor Internationale Samenwerking). Bilateral and multilateral cooperation focuses on southern Africa. In order to increase the support for development cooperation in Flanders, FICA is mainly active in four areas:

- fourth pillar initiatives
- local authorities
- the media
- development education

The relationship between migration and development is further reflected in the activities of local authorities (see below) and fourth pillar initiatives. In 2008, the fourth-pillar support centre (Steunpunt Vierde Pijler) was established in Flanders as a partnership between FICA and the umbrella organisation of the Flemish NGOs: 11.11.11. The support centre does not give any financial support to the development initiatives. The support mainly consists of training courses, advice and meetings. Organisations of ethnic minorities are not seen as a separate player in development cooperation, but as one form of fourth pillar initiatives (De Bruyn, 2010).

#### **2.3.4 Provincial**

Financial and content support from the fourth pillar is one of the spearheads in provincial policy, the other driving forces being development education and bilateral development cooperation. The province of Antwerp supports about 75 projects in the South, which mainly involve food security, the fight against poverty, basic healthcare, sustainable agriculture and forestry, basic education and literacy, organisational strengthening ... Preference is given to small-scale projects that are very firmly embedded locally and set up by a resident of the province of Antwerp or a recognised NGO. As fourth pillar initiatives, the organisations of ethnic minorities of the province of Antwerp can use this subsidies system.

### 2.3.5 Local

Many Belgian local authorities have a long tradition in international cooperation, which was often initiated by a local advisory council for development cooperation. In Flanders and Brussels, there are currently 240 Aldermen for development cooperation. 76% of municipalities have included development cooperation in their general policy document or governmental agreement. 78% have a separate budget for development cooperation and 87% have subsidies rules for project grants. In almost all local authorities, there is an advisory body for development cooperation and in 62% of local authorities there are one or more officials whose job description includes development cooperation (VVSG, 2012).

Flanders has recognised the local development initiatives since the policy document of 1999 -2004. Flanders mainly considers proximity to citizens as a positive element and sees local authorities and provinces as potential partners for training and raising awareness. In his policy letter for 2000 – 2001, Minister Anciaux states that the close ties between Flanders and the local authorities are an asset in order to reach out to local initiatives for international solidarity. The development of a policy for local authorities is one of the document's three spearheads. In order to promote and streamline local policy for development cooperation and introduce Flemish issues to consider in this respect, Flanders introduced the covenant for municipal development cooperation, which is an agreement between Flanders and the local authorities in Flanders and Brussels.

The objective of this covenant is fourfold:

- to encourage the local authority to become a fully-fledged player within the policy area of development cooperation
- to raise general awareness of municipal development cooperation within the municipality
- to strive towards good governance for municipal development cooperation within the local authority through capacity building in terms of administrative management and the conceptual development of a local policy for development cooperation
- for the local authorities involved: to support the direct cooperation between one municipality and the other in a North-South context in order to strengthen administrative power, improve public services and reinforce local democracy.

A number of cities have made city-to-city cooperation arrangements with cities in the country of origin of a specific migrant community living there. As the capital of Belgium and the host city of a substantial Congolese community, the city of Brussels is now the town twin of Kinshasa in The Democratic Republic of Congo. Mechelen and Hasselt also have city-to-city cooperation arrangements with cities in Morocco: Nador and Oulat-El-Haj, respectively.

### 2.3.6 The city of Antwerp's policy

About four years ago, the city of Antwerp started to reform its activities in the South drastically within its development cooperation policy, from institutional support of twin towns through city-to-city cooperation, which involved several city departments and institutions, to structural support for development cooperation projects in The Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana and Morocco. In its governmental agreement for 2007-2012, the city committed itself to examine whether it could use part of its resources for development cooperation in countries from where there are large migrant communities living in Antwerp. When the city-to-city cooperation with Paramaribo finished in 2009, Antwerp entered into an experimental stage of thematic educational and healthcare activities in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana and Morocco through networks of organisations of ethnic minorities from the countries in question, educational and research facilities -Antwerp University and College Association (AUHA) and Institute for Tropical Medicine (ITM)- and other interested organisations in Antwerp. The various organisations of ethnic minorities were invited to meeting events where the new policy vision was presented. Then project groups were established with the interested organisations and educational and research facilities for each country in order to plan the projects. The projects then actually started in late 2010.

The city plays three roles: it acts as a matchmaker within the network, a channel of subsidies and a capacity builder/coach.

The **purpose** of renewing the city of Antwerp's structural activities in the South is fourfold:

- Increasing the sustainability, efficiency and impact of its development cooperation initiatives by developing (matchmaker & capacity building) networks between the city, organisations of ethnic minorities, education and research institutions:
  - Organisations of ethnic minorities increase ownership, know the local needs and context and have local networks.
  - AUHA and ITM offer expertise in the fields of health and education.
- Encouraging knowledge exchange between the various actors, harmonising the efforts and increasing the development projects by supporting joint projects.
- Working with this network increases the visibility of development cooperation in Antwerp and the support for the city of Antwerp's development policy. As a result, the activities in the South also raise awareness and increase support in the North.
- By shaping its development policy in cooperation with the migrant communities, the city wants to help increase social cohesion in the city of Antwerp itself.

The activities in the North (events to raise awareness, fairtrade policy, development education, advice to Antwerp North-South organisations) and regular subsidies for development projects in the South also continue and events to raise awareness in the North are still organised by Antwerp organisations and NGOs.

### 3. Methodology

The purpose of this study is to provide insight in order to optimise the cooperation between the city of Antwerp and organisations of Congolese, Ghanaian and Moroccan migrants within its development cooperation policy. The selection of study techniques and the sampling of respondents were performed entirely according to this purpose and the presented results must therefore be used with the necessary caution and care.

A survey was performed as part of the study among members of organisations of ethnic minorities committed to development initiatives and semi-structured interviews were held with key figures and members of the organisations working with the city of Antwerp's current development policy.

#### 3.1 Interviews with the key figures

Interviews with five key figures all with expertise in development cooperation and working with the relevant migrant communities were organised in early 2012.

Key figures		
S1	African Platform	21 March 12
S2	HIVA, KU Leuven	7 March 12
S3	VVSG	5 April 12
S4	IMaMS	29 February 12
S5	City of Antwerp	25 January 12

In Antwerp, there are mainly migrants from the third migration wave (from the end of the 1960s). The migrations at the time were less organised than those that happened previously. Moroccans and Turks immigrated to Antwerp on a more individual basis instead of being recruited by industry. The area between the Scheldt and the main road around the inner city experienced the highest influx of migrants. Moroccans live in a highly concentrated area, mainly within the inner ring road 'De Singel' in Borgerhout, Het Zuid, 't Kiel and Hoboken. In Antwerp, 12 556 persons are of **Moroccan** nationality. In total, 55 982 residents of Antwerp are of Moroccan origin, most of whom are from Northern Morocco (Rif – Oriental region). 1 322 residents of Antwerp are of **Ghanaian** nationality and 1 092 of **Congolese** nationality. In total, 2 967 and 3 106 residents of Antwerp are of Ghanaian and Congolese origin, respectively. Many migrants from Congo, Ghana and Morocco living in Antwerp actively participate in development cooperation.

A topics list was created based on the literature and structured according to the SWOT matrix (Vermeylen, 2004). The following topics were included in the topics list: advantages and disadvantages of the city of Antwerp's changed policy for activities in the South from town twinning to cooperation with organisations of ethnic minorities, the strengths and weaknesses of working with organisations of ethnic minorities, the difference between organisations of ethnic minorities and fourth pillar initiatives, connections between organisations of ethnic minorities and other development actors, recommendations for the city of Antwerp's policy, good practices ...

The interviews were transcribed and encoded manually.

### 3.2 The survey

CeMIS created a survey in consultation with the staff of the city of Antwerp's development cooperation department. The purpose of the survey was to gain a better insight into the profile of migrants who are active in the city of Antwerp's development policy and the nature and approach of migrants' transnational development activities. The CeMIS staff, the staff of the city of Antwerp's development cooperation department and external respondents tested a pilot survey.

The survey asks 56 questions covering the following topics: demographic and socio-economic information, the types of money and goods transfer, the motives for them and the motives for commitment to development cooperation. The survey also includes 15 statements respondents could agree or disagree with on a four point scale (from 'strongly disagree' to 'strongly agree') to gauge migrants' attitudes towards development cooperation. The final survey was contextualised for each migrant community (Congolese, Ghanaians and Moroccans) and was translated into French (Congolese and Moroccans) and English (Ghanaians) by the city of Antwerp's translation department.

A volunteer of the city of Antwerp distributed the survey electronically and on paper to the city of Antwerp's contacts at the organisations of ethnic minorities and federations. The survey's distribution started on 10 March 2012. The survey ended on 15 June 2012. A total 114 surveys were completed and 113 were accepted for further analysis. The data was entered into a data file and was analysed with IBM SPSS Statistics 20.

### 3.3 Interviews with members of organisations of ethnic minorities

From June to August, 22 interviews were organised with members of organisations of ethnic minorities in Antwerp who are active in development cooperation: Amuka, Congo in Vlaanderen, EMIC, Free Hands vzw, Ghana Welfare, Iben Sina, IMANE, IKSI, IYAD, Marobel, Mwindi Kitoko, Namna Concept, Okeyman, Punt vzw, Steunpunt vzw, STOP vzw and VIIC. The interviews took 30 to 90 minutes and were semi-structured.

Based on a first analysis of the interviews with key figures and the survey, the CeMIS researchers created a list of topics and discussed it with the staff of the city of Antwerp's development cooperation department. The purpose of the interviews was to obtain a more detailed view of migrants' motives to commit themselves to development cooperation, the evolutions in this commitment, the difficulties migrants encountered, the successes they achieved and the impact the commitment has on their public, social and family life. Finally, they were also asked to indicate the strengths and weaknesses of the city of Antwerp's development policy and to provide any recommendations.

Interviewee number	Gender	Community	
G1	Male	Moroccan	26 July 12
G2	Male	Moroccan	In writing, 4 September 12
G3	Male	Moroccan	26 June 12
G4	Male	Moroccan	5 August 12
G5	Male	Moroccan	5 August 12
G6	Male	Moroccan	20 June 12
G7	Male	Moroccan	27 August 12
G8	Male	Moroccan	June
G9	Male	Moroccan	In writing, 9 September 12
G10	Male	Ghanaian	30 August 12
G11	Male	Ghanaian	1 August 12
G12	Male	Ghanaian	10 July 12
G13	Male	Ghanaian	10 July 12
G14	Male	Congolese	18 July 12
G15	Female	Congolese	27 June 12
G16	Male	Congolese	26 July 12
G17	Male	Congolese	18 June 12
G18	Male	Congolese	21 June 12
G19	Female	Congolese	9 July 12
G20	Male	Congolese	25 June 12

The interviews were transcribed and encoded manually.

## 4. Results

### 4.1 Description of the survey's respondent group

#### 4.1.1 Origin, age and gender

About half (55) of the 113 survey's participants belonged to the Moroccan community, 46 were Congolese and 12 were Ghanaian. 24 respondents were born in Belgium and 4 respondents were born in a country other than their country of origin. The Moroccan community in particular included many respondents who were not born in Morocco (25). Table 1 gives an overview of the distribution of respondents based on origin.

TABLE 1: DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS ACCORDING TO ORIGIN (N=113)

Origin	Number	Percentage
Congolese	46	40
Ghanaian	12	11
Moroccan	55	49
Total	113	100

Slightly over half (53%) are aged between 40 and 60. 20% of respondents are aged between 18 and 24. A minority (about one quarter) is between 25 and 40, which may be due to family circumstances and less compatibility with professional activities, since people in that age category tend to have small children whilst furthering their careers.

TABLE 2: DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS ACCORDING TO AGE CATEGORY (N=109)

Age	Number	Percentage
<18	4	4
18-24	19	18
25-29	10	9
30-39	17	16
40-49	28	26
50-59	29	27
60+	2	2
Total	109	100

Table 3 gives an overview of the age distribution within the three communities. The age distribution in all three communities is similar, except for the 18-to-24 age group, which is relatively bigger for respondents of Moroccan origin.

TABLE 3: DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS ACCORDING TO AGE CATEGORY AND ORIGIN (N=109).

Age	Congolese	Ghanaian	Moroccan	Total
<18	0	0	4	4
18-24	2	1	16	19
25-29	6	0	4	10
30-39	10	1	6	17
40-49	13	2	13	28
50-59	13	6	10	29
60+	1	0	1	2
Total	45	10	54	109

TABLE 4: DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS ACCORDING TO GENDER AND ORIGIN (N=111).

Gender	Congolese	Ghanaian	Moroccan	Total
Male	32	8	40	80
Female	13	3	15	31
Total	45	11	65	111

Tables 5 and 6 give an overview of the number of respondents born in Belgium and indicate the year of entry for the persons born in their country of origin. About a quarter of all respondents were born in Belgium, mostly of Moroccan descent. We can consider this group to be the 'second generation'. Roughly another quarter arrived in our country before 1985. These are also mainly people of Moroccan origin. As far as the Congolese are concerned, the majority arrived since 1995 and a significant share of these even arrived after 2004. For the respondents of Moroccan origin, the proportion of 'newcomers' is rather small.

TABLE 5: YEAR OF ARRIVAL IN BELGIUM (N=104).

Year of entry	Congolese	Ghanaian	Moroccan	Total
Born in Belgium	1	1	23	25
> 1975	2	0	10	12
1975-1984	2	0	10	12
1985-1994	9	4	1	14
1995-2004	17	4	2	23
After 2004	11	1	6	18
Total	41	9	29	104

TABLE 6: DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS ACCORDING TO COUNTRY OF BIRTH (N=108).

Country of birth	Congolese	Ghanaians	Moroccan	Total
Country of origin	43	9	28	80
Belgium	1	1	23	25
Other	1	0	2	3
Total	45	10	53	108

#### 4.1.2 Family situation

The majority of respondents are married or live with their partner (62 persons) and slightly over a quarter (29 persons) are single. There are no significant differences across the communities, except for 14 persons, all of them Moroccan, who have indicated 'another family situation'. These are young people (still studying and living at home).

TABLE 7: DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS ACCORDING TO FAMILY SITUATION AND ORIGIN (N=108).

Family situation	Congolese	Ghanaian	Moroccan	Total
Married/cohabiting	27	7	28	62
Single	15	3	11	29
Widow(er)	3	0	0	3
Other			14	14
Total	45	10	53	108

At least one in three respondents have no children. Particularly respondents in the Moroccan community indicate not to have any children. These are also youngsters living at home (studying). Almost one third have more than three children.

TABLE 8: DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS ACCORDING TO NUMBER OF CHILDREN AND ORIGIN (N=93).

Number of children	Congolese	Ghanaian	Moroccan	Total
None	8	2	26	36
1	7	0	1	8
2	6	1	3	10
3	6	1	4	11
>3	11	2	15	28
Total	38	6	49	93

#### 4.1.3 Education

More than half the Congolese respondents have a university or higher education degree, compared to slightly over 1 out of 6 Moroccan respondents. Over a quarter of Moroccan respondents have a qualification of vocational secondary education, compared to 1 out of 9 Congolese respondents.

TABLE 9: DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS ACCORDING TO QUALIFICATION AND ORIGIN (N=107).

Highest qualification	Congolese	Ghanaian	Moroccan	Total
Vocational secondary education	5	1	15	21
Technical secondary education	2	1	9	12
General secondary education	12	2	8	22
Non-university higher education	11	1	3	15
University	15	1	5	21
Other	0	3	13	16
Total	45	9	53	107

#### 4.1.4 Employment status and occupation

One out of three Congolese respondents are job seekers, compared to slightly less than a quarter of Moroccan respondents. The proportion of the full-time employed is about the same for both groups (41% for the Congolese and 39% for the Moroccans).

## 4.2 Transnational activities

### 4.2.1 Finding a definition

Studies of the transnational migration and development activities of people in the diaspora make a clear distinction between remittances on the one hand and social programmes to combat poverty, development aid and more organised forms of development cooperation, on the other hand (De Bruyn and Develter, 2008 and Lacroix, 2010 and Perrin and Martiniello, 2011). The people of the diaspora we interviewed as part of this survey also distinguish three forms of development cooperation: money and goods transfers (remittances), development aid and philanthropy and more organised forms of development cooperation. Most respondents and interviewees generally consider only the latter as true development cooperation. Below we distinguish three forms of transnational solidarity.

#### Remittances

It is a well-known fact that people of the diaspora send money and goods to family and friends in their country of origin. Agencies that can send money abroad have responded to this trend. The question is whether this form of aid to the country of origin can also be considered a form of development cooperation. Our study seems to indicate the contrary. Key figures in the field of migration and development cooperation as well as different interviewees from the diaspora do not necessarily categorise remittances as development cooperation. However, some do see remittances as a means for development. The difference is mainly in the beneficiaries. If the money or goods are meant for family, they are not considered development cooperation. If the beneficiaries are a different group - a school or a community, for example - they are seen as development cooperation. Some interviewees give their opinion:

*“Sending money to Morocco is not development cooperation.” (G6)*

*“Development cooperation, no. [...] So much is sent, but there is no improvement. So people stay in the same situation, because a large part of the resources goes to the support of families.” (G20)*

#### Development aid or development cooperation?

The terms development aid and development cooperation are often used interchangeably. The traditional term is development aid. In the 1970s the term development cooperation was introduced. The development cooperation actors wanted to emphasise that the receiving countries and organisations in the South are considered equal partners.

Recently the term development cooperation was also recognised as the standard term in the international community. In the Paris Declaration (2005) and Accra Agenda for Action (2008), development aid is still very much the operative word, but development cooperation was used for the Busan Declaration (2011) on Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation.

Now development aid refers to the mere transfer of money and resources to the South in order to make people's lives a little more comfortable. Development cooperation focuses on the mutual cooperation between organisations and institutions from the North and the South so that the South can stand on its own two feet. The idea is that development cooperation is more effective and sustainable, because it builds something permanent and the knowledge remains in the country itself. When aid is simply made available, the receiver is at risk of becoming 'dependent on aid'.

*“No, you send money to your family to help your family. [...] But development cooperation is slightly bigger than that. Supporting a school, for example, has nothing to do with family. It is really for the population.” (G17)*

### **Development aid**

The second category of transnational solidarity the interviewees in the survey distinguished is development aid. Development aid consists of often sporadically collected money and funds for material and infrastructural support focused on actors or institutes with which migrants have strong social and emotional ties. Such development aid can vary from taking a few materials to the country of origin on a visit to setting up large-scale fundraisers for the purchase or shipping of materials.

*“People always help their families, but usually also the neighbourhood where they grew up. This is very common among almost all Congolese. They still have ties with the neighbourhood they grew up in or the school they went to. And if someone goes back, he may take pens or notebooks for the pupils of their old school. It comes naturally. This happens on an individual level.” (G14)*

These informal forms of development aid are often the foundation for more organised development cooperation initiatives and programmes of organisations of ethnic minorities.

*“We have implemented a couple of successful projects and in the end we decided to present ourselves as an official organisation, because that way, you get more done.” (G1)*

### **Development cooperation**

A third form of transnational solidarity is more organised development cooperation. Studies have shown that migrants are certainly interested in development projects, but that until now the initiatives have had a fairly modest scope. We asked our respondents to share their view of development cooperation and they emphasised two aspects: sustainability and participation. There is only development cooperation if the projects are established with the participation of all sides and have a long-term impact in both the South and the North. Most interviewees see the participation of the local population as indispensable to ensure sustainability. They invest a lot of time in raising awareness locally and persuading the local population. A lot of responsibility is also shifted to the South, but the final word and responsibility remain with the diaspora in the North.

*“We don’t just go there and set up a project and say: “Now it’s up to you, we’ll be off.” No, I am still the leader and I decide what needs to be done ...’ (G6)*

*'Simply contribute to the evaluation, rather than going in with any direct decisions ...' (G8)*

*'I mean: we show that we can still say: OK, you are responsible here. You keep your eye on everything here. You are responsible. But don't think ...' (G6)*

*'We are partners to each other.' (G8)*

*(We are partners.) 'But don't think that you can do whatever you want here. So to speak. ... We leave it all for them.' (G6)*

*'The exchange aspects should always remain. We need each other: I won't do anything without telling you and you won't do anything without telling me.' (G8)*

*'Working together.' (G6 & G8)*

The participation of the other members of the same and other organisations of ethnic minorities in Antwerp to plan the projects is a basic element for guaranteeing the long-term support of the migrant community and making the project a success.

*"Everyone is welcome in the project. The project has open communication, but closed operations ... We adopt ideas from everywhere, but we are responsible and we have to implement it properly." (G11)*

### **Development corridors**

If we compare the Moroccan projects to the Ghanaian and Congolese projects, we see that they start from different perspectives. Contrary to the more traditional development cooperation projects of the Congolese and Ghanaian communities, which almost always focus on the organisation of education and healthcare – the topics proposed by the city of Antwerp –, most Moroccan projects tend to emphasise economic development by establishing cooperatives for raising hens, goats or sheep or growing olives. Education and health projects then receive secondary financing. The Moroccan community wants its projects to be sustainable, financially independent and regionally and transnationally embedded. An interviewee illustrates this as follows:

*"Initially the city of Antwerp's focus was on education and health, rather than cooperation's or work. At the time we said: "We want to work with the city of Antwerp and the colleges. We want to build an education and health department, but how are we going to finance this?" [...] 'And what after 2012 [local elections]? What will happen then?' Those questions remained. We did not want to put our energy in a two-year project, so we established the cooperation right from the start." (G6)*

This approach means that people are still working on health and education and higher incomes and job security.

*“We have a cooperation that generates income. We have a cooperation that started out with one part-time worker and today we have three full-time workers.” (G3)*

*“In the end we explained the project’s purpose as follows: ‘If you grow crops or produce and sell cheese, you can send your children to school and pay the medical expenses when someone falls ill.’ (G5)*

*“The project kills two birds with one stone. The people there have an income and you don’t need to keep sending money all the time. [...] You can transfer something extra once in a while, but it will never be as much as before. [...] That is the whole purpose: to make people as independent as possible from abroad and from family members.” (G1)*

The success of these cooperatives is linked to the Moroccan government’s growing interest in the north-eastern region of Morocco, which used to be neglected socially and politically. The region is also enjoying some more attention because of networking by the organisations of ethnic minorities looking for a market for the products from the cooperatives in the region. This creates ‘development corridors’ between two (or more) places where the repeated exchange of people, goods, capital and information is strongly encouraging the development of the community in the country of origin (Zoomers and van Westen, 2011).

*“The intention is to build a type of foundation that will then expand with an organisation here in Antwerp and an organisation or cooperation in Morocco. [...] To encourage more organisations to do the same, but in their own region. [...] This is a way to avoid the cliché of becoming a drop in the ocean. [...] And so you represent a chain all around the north east where we come from.” (G3)*

## 4.2.2 Transnational solidarity in practice

### Remittances

Studies have shown that migrants sometimes send considerable amounts of money and goods or take these with them as they visit family and friends in their country of origin. A majority of our respondents sends money and goods to recipients in their country of origin at least once a year. In 2011, 82 out of the 113 respondents sent a total amount of € 171 676 in money and goods to family, friends or social organisations in their country of origin. A total of € 83 741 was transferred as funds and € 87 235 worth of goods were sent including shipping costs, which can sometimes be very high. On average, the shipping cost of sending goods amounted to 30% of the value of the goods in question.

TABLE 10. AMOUNT OF MONEY AND GOODS SENT IN 2011

	number (N = 113)	Min (€)	Max (€)	Total (€)	Average (€)
Money transfers 2011	76	40	3 600	83 741	1 102
Goods transfers 2011	59	50	15 000	87 235	1 479
Transfers total value	82	40	17 000	171 676	2 094

However, these amounts are somewhat distorted by a few high peaks. These averages must therefore be considered with caution. Particularly the total value of goods transfers is very much affected by the value and shipping costs of goods sent by a few individuals. However, it was clear that people who send considerable amounts stated that they did this regularly. It is also difficult to distinguish whether these are mere remittances in their own name or collective shipments <sup>2</sup> the respondent in question is responsible for.

Table 11 gives an overview of the size of amounts sent by individual respondents in 2011. The table also outlines the value of the goods sent by the individual respondents. About one third of our respondents sent between € 500 and € 1 000 in 2011. Particularly respondents of Moroccan origin also sent lower amounts and goods worth less than € 500. Congolese respondents sent amounts exceeding € 1500.

<sup>2</sup> Here collective shipments are seen as shipments for which several persons collect or join an amount or goods to be sent together in order to lower the shipment costs.

TABLE 11. AMOUNTS SENT IN 2011 ACCORDING TO ETHNIC GROUP

Money transfer amount classes (€)	Congolese (n = 37)	Ghanaian (n = 9)	Moroccan (n = 31)	Total (N = 77)
Under 100			2	2
100-249	1		5	6
250-499	2		9	11
500-999	11	2	12	25
1 000-1 499	6	3	2	11
1 500-1 999	7	2		9
2 000-2 999	4		1	5
Above 3 000	6	2		8
Goods transfer amount classes (€)	Congolese (n = 31)	Ghanaian (n = 7)	Moroccan (n = 21)	Total (N = 59)
Under 100			1	1
100-249	4		3	7
250-499	2		9	11
500-999	10	3	4	17
1 000-1 499	5	1	4	10
1 500-1 999	2			2
2 000-2 999	3	1		4
Above 3 000	5	2		7

Remarkably, there is not always a connection between the level of income and the size of the amount that is sent to the country of origin. As De Bruyn and Develtere (2008: 8) put it: “Someone’s payslip determines what he gives, not whether he gives.” Our interviews also show that people with low incomes send considerable amounts to their country of origin:

*“Suppose someone earns € 900 or € 1 000. When the rent has been paid, there is about € 500 to € 600 left. If the individual can get by on € 200 to € 300, he will try and spend as little as possible and send € 300 to his family. That is why an awful lot of money is sent there.” (G10)*

Goods and money are generally sent to the country of origin frequently. Half the respondents send money regularly (weekly or monthly) or several times a year. About 40% of respondents send goods to their country of origin at least once a year. Table 12 shows that slightly under half of all Congolese respondents send money

every month (19 persons) and send goods at least annually (20 persons). Moroccans seem to send money and goods slightly less frequently. Most send money once or twice (14 persons) or 3 or 4 times (13 persons) a year. Compared to the respondents of Congolese origin, respondents of Moroccan origin tend to send goods annually.


TABLE 12. MONEY AND GOODS TRANSFER FREQUENCY ACCORDING TO ETHNIC GROUP

Money transfer frequency	Congolees (n = 43)	Ghanees (n = 12)	Marokkaans (n = 55)	Totaal (N = 110)
Weekly	2		1	3
Monthly	19	3	2	24
3-4 times a year	11	4	13	28
1-2 times a year	2	2	14	18
In cases of emergency	9	1	6	16
Never		2	19	21
Goods transfer frequency	Congolees (n = 45)	Ghanees (n = 12)	Marokkaans (n = 54)	Totaal (N = 111)
Weekly	13		7	20
Monthly	7	3	13	23
3-4 times a year	1	2		3
1-2 times a year	5	3	3	11
In cases of emergency	16	1	2	19
Never	3	3	29	35


Within the three communities, we see that the most respondents primarily send money to their families. To the Congolese and Moroccans, social organisations come second and friends come third. After looking after their families, the Ghanaian respondents send money to friends. They do not send money to other persons or organisations.

Goods are also mainly sent to family. To the Congolese, social organisations come second and friends come third. To Moroccans and Ghanaians, friends come second and social organisations come third. Goods are mainly used to meet basic needs. Particularly the Congolese respondents also use goods to support social projects.

GRAPH 1. BENEFICIARIES OF MONEY TRANSFERS ACCORDING TO ETHNIC GROUP (SEVERAL ANSWERS ARE POSSIBLE, ABSOLUTE NUMBERS)



GRAPH 2. BENEFICIARIES OF GOODS TRANSFERS PER ETHNIC GROUP (SEVERAL ANSWERS ARE POSSIBLE, ABSOLUTE NUMBERS)



Nevertheless, Table 12 also shows that over a third of respondents states never to send any money (21) or to send money only in cases of emergency (16). If we consider the shipment of goods, this number increases to up to half of all respondents. The respondents who state 'never' to send any money or 'only in cases of emergency' are mainly in the Moroccan community. Further analysis shows that this group consists of young respondents and respondents who were not born in the country of origin. The next section '4.3 Who is responsible for transnational solidarity?' discusses this further.

### **Commitment to development cooperation initiatives**

Transnational commitment is not simply sending money or goods to family in the country of origin. In recent years, migrants and organisations of ethnic minorities are more and more committed to transnational development aid and more organised development cooperation initiatives. In addition to financial resources, they use their experience, knowledge, ideas, transnational contacts and networks and socio-cultural expertise they have developed as an migrant for the development of the region of origin or the launch of development cooperation initiatives (De Bruyn and Develtere, 2008 and Perrin and Martiniello, 2011 and de Haas, 2006 and Faist, 2008 and Meireman, 2003 and Lacroix, 2009). In an interview about the commitment of migrants and organisations of ethnic minorities in transnational development cooperation initiatives, a key figure stated:

*"All organisations of ethnic minorities except the churches and the youth organisations focus on development cooperation. If you look at the byelaws of the organisations of ethnic minorities, you see: 'North-South Cooperation' or 'North-South Development'. It is the standard for almost 90 percent of organisations. Mind you, these are the sub-Sahara African organisations. Moroccan organisations have quite a different story. To Moroccans, development cooperation is almost a new concept. They don't all engage in structured development cooperation. The African community knows more about the NGOs. After all, there are more NGOs in black Africa than in the Maghreb. [...] I think that the presence of the NGOs in Africa contributes to migrants' awareness of the importance of development cooperation." (S1)*

This is partly confirmed by the survey figures (Table 6). Slightly more than half the respondents with a Moroccan background state that they are committed to a development cooperation initiative, compared to over three quarters of the respondents of Congolese origin.

TABLE 13: COMMITMENT TO DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION ACCORDING TO ETHNIC BACKGROUND

Commitment to development cooperation	Congolese (n = 46)	Ghanaian (n = 12)	Moroccan (n = 55)	Total (N = 113)
Yes	35	7	29	71
No	11	5	26	42

Our interviews also confirm these figures. Interviewees from the Moroccan community playing active roles in organisations state that although many Moroccan organisations of ethnic minorities in Antwerp occasionally raise money at solidarity events and religious feasts (the joint breaking of the fast at Iftar ...) in order to send aid to developments, only a limited number of organisations have development cooperation as a specific purpose: Imane vzw, Steunproject vzw, TamTamGoGo, Iben Sina, Marobel ... One of the interviewees explains this as follows:

*“People tend to wait and see. When you are successful, people tend to join. Volunteering is quite a big word in the Moroccan community, so that our voluntary efforts for the projects are difficult to understand by some. Some people think: ‘Why would I be interested in that? Setting something up 3 000 kilometres away in a different country?’ [...] These people think we are mad. They say: ‘I regularly send my sister money or clothes, but what are you doing? Investing all that money in a project – isn’t that going a bit too far?’ But, not everybody thinks like this. There are also people who provide a lot of support. They take their hat off to what we have achieved and are able to do.” (G6)*

Following the success of the current projects in Morocco, the interviewees do expect a rise in the number of new initiatives in the (near) future.

### 4.3 Who is responsible for transnational solidarity?

Not all migrants send money or goods or engage in transnational development cooperation activities (De Bruyn and Develtere, 2008 and Wets et al., 2004 and Perrin and Martiniello, 2011). The previous paragraphs have taught us that there are large differences between the migrant communities in terms of sending money and goods and the commitment to development cooperation. However, there are large differences within migrant communities as well. It is interesting to see which profile factors make certain migrants susceptible to transnational solidarity.

It goes without saying that not all migrants have the same profile. Some immigrate for economic reasons, other have fled for political reasons. A number come to this country for their higher education. One is highly educated, the other is unskilled. The diversity of the migrant population is characterised by several other properties. In addition, the descendants of migrants form second and subsequent generations,

but they all continue to have their specific traditions, experiences and immigration stories. One of the key figures explained it like this:

*“It is not always a question of immigration itself, but the migrant’s life project. The relationship he has with his country of origin and what he does for it is intrinsically linked to him being a migrant, his career and the reason why he became an migrant.” (S1)*

Studies have shown that migrants with a higher integration level in the immigration country are also more active in transnational activities and development (Gowricharn, 2010). Portes and others (Portes et al., 2009) report that transnational initiatives by Latino migrant communities in the United States are highly dependent on their participation in social and political life in the US itself and their security in terms of residency status and income. We find similar results for first-generation Ghanaians in the Netherlands (Mazzucato, 2008). A study of migrants’ transnational activities in Belgium (Perrin and Martiniello, 2011) confirms that having a legal status and financial resources are important elements in order to set up more complex and successful transnational projects. Equally, discrimination and lack of prospects in Belgium can also motivate some migrants to commit to transnational practices. Transnational activities offer a way to improve or compensate for their lower socio-professional situation in Belgium, as it were, although this is not the main reason for their commitment (Perrin and Martiniello, 2011). This connection between commitment to transnational projects and compensation behaviour for the socio-professional situation is confirmed by studies of the Congolese migrants’ commitment to development cooperation. Highly educated, but unemployed Congolese migrants look for other ways to make a difference either in a society or with transnational activities to meet their social obligations to the home front, to safeguard their social position in the community in Belgium and to improve their professional situation by using the network they created in the transnational space (De Bruyn et al., 2008).

However, studies by Lacroix (2010 and 2009) into transnational development cooperation initiatives by Moroccan and Algerian migrant communities do not find a clear connection between the commitment to more complex and structural development cooperation initiatives and the level of individual integration. This is the migrants’ performance level on an economic, cultural, political and educational level. However, there does seem to be a positive relationship between functional integration and the existing access to public spaces and the commitment to development cooperation initiatives. In this context, Lacroix (2010 and 2009) distinguishes two types of leaders/champions: the more traditional leaders with a strong social position within the migrant community, who can facilitate the internal financial resources, on the one hand, and the leaders with a high level of functional integration, who can gain access to external sources of finance.

Studies by Perrin and Martiniello (2010) also showed that with the exception of the Congolese community, female migrants are less active or active in a different way in transnational social spaces compared to men. The fact that women are involved less does not mean that some Moroccan and Turkish women do take initiatives. Sometimes these projects are relatively easy to manage, not complex and with little financial importance. Finally, studies of the fourth pillar of development cooperation shows that the active members of private fourth pillar initiatives<sup>3</sup> are usually people with an important civil and social life and ties with the South, but less economic activity, such as pensioners and students. People aged between thirty and fifty are less involved, because they are busy doing other things, such as their careers and their family (Develtere, 2005 and De Bruyn and Huyse, 2009).

#### 4.3.1 Gender


The study confirms that fewer female migrants are engaged in transnational activities. First, we see that women are under-represented in the group of survey respondents. Only 31 women completed the survey, compared to 80 men.

We see that about half of the female survey respondents say that they are committed to development cooperation initiatives, compared to about two thirds of male respondents. Proportionally, more women also send money rarely (15 out of 27 female participants), whereas more men send money regularly (44 out of 78 participants).


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<sup>3</sup> These initiatives are not embedded in existing institutional structures of organisations such as trade unions, companies, hospitals, schools, municipalities, foundations, ...

GRAPH 3. FREQUENCY OF MONEY TRANSFERS ACCORDING TO GENDER AND MIGRANT COMMUNITY



GRAPH 4. COMMITMENT TO DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION ACCORDING TO GENDER AND MIGRANT COMMUNITY



An analysis about the place of birth across the entire group of respondents (on the understanding that most respondents born in Belgium belong to the Moroccan community) shows that the gender effect does not apply to the Congolese community. Relatively speaking, the women are equally active in development cooperation as the men. This confirms the results of a previous study of the transnational activities of migrants in Belgium (Perrin and Martiniello, 2011). Our data do not allow us to either confirm or deny that this relatively equal level of transnational activities for men and women in the Congolese community has a cultural reason, as put forward in the study by Perrin and Martiniello.

Our interviews told us that Moroccan women do take initiatives and that some organisations, such as Steunproject vzw and Imane, really make an effort to promote separate activities for women. However, these projects are for smaller scale, ad hoc development aid and mainly consist of raising financial resources. A number of male interviewees also recognised the positive effect women have on the operation of their organisation.

#### 4.3.2 Age and generation

(Inter)national studies (Cohen, 2011 and De Bruyn and Develtere, 2008) have shown that the giving behaviour of the younger migrant generations is different from the older ones. Although many younger migrants still send money and goods, the frequency and amounts of these remittances reduces. This is usually explained by the weaker social and emotional ties the younger generation has with its country of origin. A survey of the King Baldwin Foundation shows that second-generation migrants from Turkey send considerably less money to their family than the first generation (De Bruyn and Develtere, 2008): 44% of Turkish Belgians born in Turkey send money or goods to their family, compared to 25% of the second generation (De Bruyn and Develtere, 2008).

Within our survey, the younger migrants and second-generation migrants tend to be respondents from the Moroccan community. We see that mainly this group states to send money and goods to the country of origin only rarely. These results correspond to the results from the survey by Cohen (2011) and de Bruyn and Develtere (2008). However, we must also recognise that many of these younger respondents (17) from the Moroccan community are still studying and living at home, which may provide a partial explanation as to why they give less in addition to their weaker social and emotional ties with the country of origin. We will come back to the weaker social and emotional ties in paragraph '4.4. Motives for transnational solidarity'.

TABLE 14. FREQUENCY OF REMITTANCES WITHIN THE MOROCCAN COMMUNITY CATEGORISED ACCORDING TO AGE CATEGORY AND COUNTRY OF BIRTH

Country of birth	Age category	Under 30	Between 30 and 50	Over 50	Total
Morocco (n=28)	Regularly		6	6	12
	Annually		6	5	11
	In cases of emergency		2		2
	Never	1	2		3
Belgium (n=23)	Regularly	1			1
	Annually	2	1		3
	In cases of emergency	4			4
	Never	13	1		14
Other (n=4)	Regularly		2		2
	Annually				
	In cases of emergency				
	Never	2			2

When we take a closer look at the commitment to development cooperation of the second- and third-generation migrants and the respondents under 30<sup>4</sup>, we notice that the majority in both groups (21 out of 33 second- and third-generation migrants and 19 out of 26 persons under 30) state that they are not committed to development cooperation. This is a remarkable finding bearing in mind the active role of these persons in the initiatives of the organisations they are a member of in the country of origin. According to the current definitions (see above), these initiatives are described as development cooperation. This can be partly explained by a different understanding as to what development cooperation is. An interviewed man of a Congolese organisation explains it as follows:

*“Development cooperation within an organisation is like a train. There are the train engine and the carriages. [...] Most survey participants are volunteers. They are carriages rather than engines. We also need the carriages. To work together. [...] For example, there are people who say: ‘Look, we will join in this activity.’ [...] But they will not stay and think and plan, because that also takes time. These people have to go to work and they have their own lives to live. That is not always easy.” (G17)*

<sup>4</sup> These are mainly people from the Moroccan community.

However, this does not mean that young people are not active. To the contrary, they are involved in projects. Particularly the children of the chairmen of organisations of ethnic minorities who are active in the South, contribute to initiatives taken by their parents. For example, they organise fundraising activities to benefit their organisation's project (sports club, organisations of ethnic minorities, cultural organisations ...) and they help their parents with administrative tasks. However, they do not always consider these activities as active commitment to development cooperation.

Finally, the survey shows that mainly respondents under 30 agreed to the statement 'My commitment is a result of my religion.' It is possible that young people of Moroccan descent see their commitment and solidarity as a matter of course or duty of charity<sup>5</sup> within their religious experience and do not consider it to be a commitment to development cooperation as such. This finding is also described by De Bruyn and Develtere (2008).

#### **4.3.3 Individual and functional integration**

Our survey and interviews show that the migrants active in development cooperation are not always the most disadvantaged. This finding is also in line with other studies (Portes, 2009, Gowricharn, 2010, Mazzucato, 2008, Perrin & Martinello, 2011). Many leaders of organisations of ethnic minorities are middle class with a relatively secure income, residence status and social position.

#### **Economic success**

The people who state that they are committed to organised development cooperation initiatives tend to have jobs. This applies to the three communities. In the Moroccan community, they are mainly manual workers (16) and in the Congolese group they are mainly office workers (10). However, in the Congolese community there is also an important group of people who are not working (including 2 pensioners and 12 job seekers), but who state that they are committed to development cooperation (14 out of 32).

Whether the commitment of job seekers is a form of compensation or a way to improve their social and professional situation cannot be confirmed based on the data. Most respondents of Congolese origin generally did not agree or disagree with the statement "Commitment to development cooperation will give me more prestige in my community." With a score of 2.77 (2 = disagree & 3 = agree), Congolese job seekers are not very different from the other categories and the average score for the Congolese respondents (2.65). During the interviews with

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<sup>5</sup> The Muslim community has a strong tradition of giving. Charity is explicitly described in the Quran. Zakāt is the annual alms Muslims give to the poor. It is an obligation for those who believe and makes up 2.5% of one's income. Sadaqah is the aspect of charity in Islam. It can be a financial gift, a service or a simple gesture of charity and understanding. Unlike zakāt, sadaqah is voluntary rather than compulsory (De Bruyn & Develtere, 2008).

members of organisations of ethnic minorities, commitment to social transnational activities such as development cooperation initiatives was not considered as a way to improve one's social and professional situation.

However, our interviews do show that many leaders of organisations have a job that allows them a high level of flexibility to fulfil their voluntary commitments. The preparation and management for the more organised and structural transnational developments cooperation initiatives require a lot of time and flexibility. In addition to drafting a file and consulting with organisation members and the other partners in the cooperation with the city of Antwerp, they travel to the region of origin to talk to the local population and monitor the project locally. They also sometimes receive delegations from the South, draft subsidy applications and organise social (secondary) activities. Some leaders travel to see their partners in the South several times a year. The son of one of the leaders explains:

*“My father has the advantage that he works one week and is off the next. He works from six at night to six in the morning. Seven days a week. That is 70 hours a week. So every four weeks he gets two weeks off. The week he isn't working, he tends to leave for Morocco on the Sunday night as soon as he finishes work. He then spends the entire week in Morocco, but on Monday he has to get back to work. [...] My uncle is self-employed. He asks his co-workers to replace him when he is in Morocco.”(G7)*

Still such flexibility and voluntary activities must not be taken for granted. The following testimonials show that the time-intensive nature of people's commitments sometimes becomes a heavy burden:

*“Sometimes it is hard and time-consuming, particularly when I need to combine my commitments with my studies. [...] There is no time for leisure activities or friends.” (G4)*

*“I work in my own business all day. How many times do we need to attend meetings with the city? With the people of the college? To them, these meetings are part of their job, but to us they aren't. It is volunteering to us. It requires so much work. Is there anybody who can take over some of the burden we carry? [...] Drafting a file for subsidies is our biggest obstacle. [...] Why do I have to be present all the time? I am just a volunteer. Now, for example: I made time for you, but normally I should be at work.” (G3)*

*“You need to invest so much time in certain things and you get € 12 500? That doesn't include the time I spend in order to implement the project.” (G13)*

*“All those people on the project, one barely sleeps, the other constantly travels between Congo and Belgium. It is a full-time job for two to three people.” (G16)*

The time invested in the preparation and follow-up of projects sometimes conflicts with other work obligations. Some interviewees ask to ensure that the commitment to the city of Antwerp’s development cooperation for the activities in the South does not put people’s jobs at risk. A number of leaders and members of organisations combine temporary jobs or periods of employment with periods of inactivity. In other words, the job security of some leaders is not always obvious.

### **Educational success**

If we look at the educational level, we see that it is not always the highly educated who are committed to transnational activities. Within the group of Moroccan people claiming to be committed to development cooperation, the majority has qualifications from vocational or technical secondary education. Only among the Congolese do we see many highly educated people committed to development cooperation.

### **Social success**

Success on a social level can be interpreted in different ways: having a family, dedicating a great deal of one’s life to civil society or having a central position in the community.

The survey shows that the majority of respondents active in more organised development cooperation initiatives have a spouse or a life partner. In the Congolese community, we find a large group of singles who say they are committed to development cooperation (13 out of 42). They are widows/widowers or migrants who recently arrived from Congo. We also see that, with the exception of respondents born in Belgium (this category includes a large proportion of young people studying and living at home), most respondents committed to development cooperation across the three communities have one or several children.

Particularly people aged between 30 and 50 who are living with a partner and have children are the most likely to be committed to development cooperation. This profile is different from the traditional private fourth pillar initiatives, which were mainly set up by students and the elderly (Develtere, 2005 and De Bruyn and Huyse, 2009). This is confirmed in the interviews with the members of organisations of ethnic minorities. Still it appears that this commitment is not always easy to combine with family life, as explained by the next respondent:

*“For example, I won’t say I can’t make it because I have no child care for my son. I will take him with me. We go, because I feel it is too important and I also feel my son is important. We try to find the right balance, which is not always easy.” (G17)*

Whether the respondents who are active in organised transnational development cooperation initiatives also play an important role in civil society is illustrated by the interviews with members of the organisations of ethnic minorities. Most active members seem to combine their commitment to development cooperation with another social commitment in religious, social or cultural organisations, the boards of umbrella organisations, NGOs, trade unions, parent councils ...

One striking aspect is the mutual commitment in the Congolese community: the members of the Congolese organisations of ethnic minorities sit on each other’s boards. This is less so in Ghanaian and Moroccan organisations. The interviews also show that the migrants of Moroccan origin’s commitment to civil society are more locally oriented (the district they live in or the city of Antwerp), whereas the Ghanaians and Congolese are committed to national, regional or even international organisations. The study by Perrin and Martiniello (2011) showed similar findings.

The huge commitment the leaders of organisations of ethnic minorities show to civil society has a positive impact on their functional integration. First, it strengthens their social network and second, it strengthens their social position in the community, which helps to raise internal funds for the development cooperation initiatives and the social commitment of the other members of the community. Almost all leaders of organisations of ethnic minorities act as a bridge between migrant communities and society at large, which promotes the migrants’ individual integration.

#### **4.3.4 Does commitment to development cooperation replace remittances?**

We see no connection between migrants’ commitment in development cooperation and remittances. In other words, migrants who are committed to (in)formal development aid do not necessarily stop sending money or goods to their country of origin as a result. To the contrary, almost 62% of respondents who state that they are committed to development cooperation initiatives still regularly send money to their country of origin. For goods transfers, this percentage is slightly over 46%. Significantly, many of those who are not committed to development cooperation also rarely send money and goods. These are mainly people under 30 (see above).

TABLE 15. CONNECTION BETWEEN COMMITMENT TO DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION (DC) AND THE FREQUENCY OF MONEY AND GOODS TRANSFERS

Commitment to DC	Regularly (n = 55)	Annually (n = 18)	Exceptionally (n = 37)	Total (N = 110)
Yes	42	13	13	68
No	13	5	24	42

Commitment to DC	Regularly (n = 43)	Every couple of years (n = 14)	Exceptionally (n = 54)	Total (N = 111)
Yes	32	10	27	69
No	11	4	27	42

The interviewees also confirm that the commitment to development cooperation does not replace the sending of remittances:

*“I still send money myself, but I do so outside the society. This is not something that is discussed with the members. It is simply personal. I send money to family: uncles or aunts who need money or someone in need of an operation. They ask for the money and you raise the funds through family members rather than the society. The society deals with long-term projects.” (G1)*

*“There are still members who send money. People do not stop sending money simply because they are a member of the organisation.” (G6)*

The view of certain people in Moroccan organisations is also noteworthy: to them, their initiatives - mainly the establishment of cooperatives - are a lever towards independence from remittances.

*“They no longer give money. What they may do is buy two or three goats for their family, for example. Then they can sell the milk.” (G8)*

*“That is the system. We started to provide microcredit. You get four or five goats and milk. There may be a member who still sends money to his family if they have not yet qualified for the project, but they may have an idea like: ‘Look, if I buy goats directly, that would sort me out.’ “ (G6 & G8)*

This type of objective may partly explain why Moroccan organisations organise their activities in their place of birth or their family’s place of residence.

## 4.4 Motives for setting up transnational development cooperation activities

### 4.4.1 Money and goods transfers

The survey shows that the main motives for sending money are requests from family in the country of origin (62% of respondents) and a visit to the country of origin (61% of respondents). About one third of respondents answering the question also indicated that they sent money as a gift on social occasions like a wedding or other event. Compared to the respondents from the Congolese and Ghanaian community, who mainly send money and goods at the request of family, respondents of Moroccan descent<sup>6</sup> mainly give money on their own initiative after visiting the country of origin. For Congolese respondents, giving money after a visit is in second place. For Moroccan and Congolese respondents, providing money as a gift is in third place. Congolese respondents also have other motives for giving, such as requests from friends or commercial purposes. These are less common with respondents from the Moroccan or Ghanaian community.

The shipment of goods follows a similar pattern to that of money. Goods are generally provided less often as a gift on social occasions (wedding, birth, communion ...). Goods are also sent at the request of friends in the country of origin, mainly by respondents of a Congolese background.

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
<sup>6</sup> Again we have to point out here that a large group of Moroccans born in Belgium indicate that they never send money or goods and are therefore not included in this table.

TABLE 16. MOTIVES FOR SENDING MONEY AND GOODS ACCORDING TO ETHNIC BACKGROUND (WHY DO YOU TRANSFER MONEY? SEVERAL ANSWERS ARE POSSIBLE)


Motives for money transfers	Congolese (n = 46)	Ghanaian (n = 10)	Moroccan (n = 36)	Total (N = 92)
At the request of family in the country of origin	36	8	13	57
Own initiative after visiting the country of origin	28	3	25	56
As a gift on social occasions	15		16	31
At the request of friends in the country of origin	9	4	1	14
For commercial purposes	3		2	5
At the request of others in the country of origin	2		2	4
Motives for goods transfers	Congolese (n = 39)	Ghanaian (n = 9)	Moroccan (n = 27)	Total (N = 75)
At the request of family in the country of origin	30	5	14	49
Own initiative after visiting the country of origin	22	3	16	41
At the request of friends in the country of origin	11	2	3	16
As a gift on social occasions	8	1	5	14
At the request of others in the country of origin	2		2	6
For commercial purposes	3		2	1

If we look at how the money is spent, we see that it is mainly used to buy basic goods and pay for education and medical care. The Congolese and Ghanaian respondents indicate that the money is spent firstly on school, secondly on food and thirdly on medical care. Moroccan respondents indicate that the money first goes to food, then to medical care and thirdly to school fees. A major part of the money that is sent by Congolese migrants also goes to social projects, funerals and weddings, which is not so much the case with the Ghanaian and Moroccan respondents. The survey also shows that the goods transfers are mainly used to meet the basic needs of family in the country of origin. A small number of Congolese respondents indicate that they also send goods as part of development cooperation.

GRAPH 5. USE OF REMITTANCES (MONEY) IN THE COUNTRY OF ORIGIN ACCORDING TO MIGRANT COMMUNITY (SEVERAL ANSWERS ARE POSSIBLE, ABSOLUTE NUMBERS)



GRAPH 6. USE OF THE SHIPPED GOODS IN THE COUNTRY OF ORIGIN ACCORDING TO MIGRANT COMMUNITY (SEVERAL ANSWERS ARE POSSIBLE, ABSOLUTE NUMBERS)



Money and goods therefore seem to be sent to meet the direct needs of family. On average, the respondents (103) agreed to statements saying that the strong should help the weak, everyone should take responsibility for the poor and helping family in the country of origin is a social duty. There is no significant variation in this average across the ethnic groups. This variation across ethnic groups should also be interpreted with caution, as the number of respondents is very small in some categories, such as the Ghanaian community (9). This makes the average score is easily distorted by peaks.

TABLE 17. AVERAGE SCORES FOR STATEMENTS ACCORDING TO ETHNIC GROUP (1-4; 1 = STRONGLY DISAGREE AND 4 = STRONGLY AGREE)

Statements	Congolese (n = 44)	Ghanaian (n = 9)	Moroccan (n = 50)	Total (N = 103)
The strong should help the weak in society.	3.36	3.56	3.62	3.50
Everyone should take responsibility to do something for the poor in the world.	3.44	3.44	3.52	3.48
It is my duty to do something for my family in my country of origin.	3.38	2.90	3.44	3.36

The interviews confirm that the migrants see their money and goods transfers as an unwritten moral obligation to meet their social debt to the home front. A number of interviewees consider it as culturally embedded “African solidarity” (G15) or as another interviewee puts it:

*“In African culture, we have a responsibility and a moral duty to send back money and aid and we are very pleased to do so when we have something, because we cannot achieve our own welfare without the others.” (G20)*

As widely discussed in previous paragraphs, second- and third-generation and young migrants send less money and fewer goods. Several studies (De Bruyn and Develtere, 2008 and Cohen, 2011) see the weaker ties with family in the country of origin and the integration in and focus on society in the host country as major reasons for this change in giving behaviour. The results of the survey do not give a clear, significant insight into the reasons for reduction in giving behaviour. In order to assess the ties with the country of origin, the respondents were asked whether their parents still lived in the country of origin and whether they were born in the country of origin. Although we see a clear relationship between age and of course generation on the one hand and still having parents in the country of origin on the other hand (24 of 31 respondents under the age of 30 and 25 out of 28 respondents not born in the country of origin no longer have parents in the country of origin), we fail to find a significant pattern in the relationship between the frequency

with which money and goods are sent and having parents in the country of origin. However, our interviews do confirm these assumptions. A first-generation migrant from Ghana attributes the change in the second generation's commitment to sending money and goods to the loss of family and emotional ties with the country of origin. A second-generation migrant from Morocco confirms this as follows:

*“Aunt A or aunt B is hungry, so you send money. In the 1970s and 80s things were different... Back then the migrants still had parents or sometimes grandparents in their country, but those people are gradually dying. The ties with Morocco become weaker.” (G7)*

However, the younger generation, certainly the active members of the organisations of ethnic minorities we interviewed, still experiences strong ties with their family in their country of origin. Their parents socialise them into this commitment to money and goods transfers from a young age.

*“When I wanted a modern pair of trousers for school, my daddy said: ‘Well, that’s expensive. You can’t think like that, because I still need to send money to your granny, your aunt, etc.’ Your concern automatically grows, even as a child. You feel guilty.” (G3)*

The impact of the parents as they pass on solidarity with family is strongly reflected in the reason given by the second-generation migrant interviewee in the above quote as to why his giving behaviour changed. In addition to disappearing family ties, the change in attitude of his father also plays an important part, as shown in the following quote:

*“Whether my motivation has changed? Especially after my father had said: ‘Hmm, Morocco ... Do you really have to go ten times a year? Better go to the Netherlands to visit family there.’” (G7)t*

The survey confirms that visits to the country of origin are an important motivation for sending money and goods. 61% of respondents indicated they sent money on their own initiative after visiting their country of origin and 55% of respondents indicated they sent goods for the same reason. The interviews also show that visits to the country of origin play a major part in the renewal and strengthening of transnational feelings of solidarity. Two interviewed organisation leaders emphasise the importance of promoting such visits to the country of origin the second and third generations, for example by organising tailor-made immersion trips for the younger generation of Congolese (G16) or by encouraging first-generation parent organising their children with them when they visit their country of origin.

*“Their commitment is likely to be different from ours and that is what I am trying to tell people. What I myself try and do, for example, is to take my entire family with me when I need to travel to Ghana. I also intend to take the children to Ghana every*

*two or three years or so if possible, so they can develop a kinship and create a bond with Ghana and see what the problems are. Of course, not everyone can afford to do this. Many people don't take their children with them when they travel. The children simply grow up here and so lose all their ties with Ghana. They don't see what sort of problems exist there. They have simply become Belgians. [...] Then we have to try and help them to forge a connection from a young age. Some do, but it isn't easy. It costs a lot of money.” (G10)*

#### **4.4.2 Reorientation of transnational solidarity**

Migrants who have lived in Belgium for a long time have what De Bruyn and Develtere (2008) call a hyphenated identity. On the one hand they have a connection with the country of origin, a connection that is built or strengthened by socialisation and local visits. During these visits, they are faced with the reality, needs and problems of the country of origin or their family there points out their social duties to them, which then urges them to start or renew their transnational commitment. On the other hand, they see themselves as fully-fledged members of society in Belgium, Flanders or Antwerp and they are faced with the difficulties and cost of living in this society. It is this hyphenated mentality that is the reason for many interviewed active members of organisations of ethnic minorities to start up more organised transnational development cooperation initiatives. Due to the high cost of living, it is no longer self-evident to send half your pay as people did in the 1970s and 80s, for example. This is mentioned by several interviewees:

*“In the beginning you send financial help, but you can't really keep that up. So we have decided after all to take a different course, to start up projects ...” (G1)*

*“Why do we set up development cooperation initiatives? Look, how much money do we send each month? It is too much, really. We simply have to give those people a job.” (G18)*

By meeting the social pressure to send money, migrants sometimes find it hard to make ends meet at the end of the month. The current economic crisis hasn't helped. There is also growing discontent with the continued demand for financial help from the country of origin, which in some cases is also accompanied by a feeling of powerlessness.

*“People hope that some day, it will stop. Solidarity is good, but there are limits. The idea is that our country develops sufficiently to allow us to keep what little money we have here in Belgium available for our lives here, because the children who are born here are becoming frustrated with the small sum of money that could be used here, but is sent there.” (G16)*

*“The families who we send the money to always thank us for our voluntary generosity. Then they always say: ‘Our needs are great’, but in the end, we can't do anything about that.” (G20)*

They are also starting to question the money and goods transfers and the sporadic transnational activities of previous generations, because they are financially very demanding, particularly with the rising cost of living, and do not seem to be very fruitful. The following statement is a good reflection of this feeling:

*“There was always very much a sense of solidarity within the community. The mosque unites people here and there. If the mosque had to be maintained, what do people do here? They raise funds every year. In the beginning, in the 1980s and 90s, the community wasn’t that big and the money that was raised was not much either. It was just used for the mosque. Then the community became bigger and bigger. There were a lot of members and there was a lot of money. And a lot of money means a lot of opinions. So the mosque is painted, but what will we do with the rest of the money? That’s when it all starts and money gets wasted. [...] A lot of money and we, the younger generation, think: ‘This can’t be happening. People raise money, but they don’t know what to do with it. Painting a mosque, building mosque, while there are children who are not going to school.’ So we said: ‘Look, we are a young generation and we can’t follow in the footsteps of this older generation. Let us start something else.’ ” (G6)*

This trend evokes reactions, particularly from second- or third-generation youngsters. According to them, their parents continue to focus too much on the South and send money to their family in the country of origin every month, but they do not pay enough attention to the problems youngsters experience in Belgium when they go to school, look for a job or endeavour to buy luxury products.

*“Every family. One sends a huge amount, the other sends very little, but there is always a certain amount going over there. Ask anyone. Of course, the first generation. Our parents almost permanently. They neglected us for family in Morocco.” (G3)*

*“Especially now with people trying to survive the economic crisis. [...] Young people see it, they calculate it in bags of crisps or loaves of bread. They see a big box leaving every few months, while they could really use it here as well. That is also the reason why we start these projects. The second or third generation will say: ‘Let them drop dead. If they can’t stand on their own two feet after all those years of financial help, they can drop dead as far as I am concerned.’ ” (G1)*

#### **4.4.3 Development cooperation**

In general, the survey shows that respondents mainly commit to development cooperation on their own initiative because of the situation in their country of origin (72.6%) and because of their personal conviction (58.1%). A large group of Congolese respondents (16 out of 33) also indicates that their commitment is based on demand from social organisations in their country of origin, but this is not the case for respondents in the Moroccan and Ghanaian group. Unlike money and goods transfers, visits to the country of origin do not seem to motivate migrants

to commit to development cooperation. Demand by local authorities in the host country or the country of origin and demand by other traditional NGOs seem to have little impact on motivation.

TABLE 18: MOTIVATION FOR DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION ACCORDING TO ETHNIC GROUP (SEVERAL ANSWERS ARE POSSIBLE)

Motives	Congolese (n = 33)	Ghanaian (n = 2)	Moroccan (n = 27)	Total (N = 62)
Own initiative because of the situation in the country of origin	21	2	22	45
Personal conviction	20		16	36
Demand from social organisation in the country of origin	16			16
For social contacts	7	1	6	14
Demand from family in the country of origin	2	0	7	9
Demand from migrant or migrant organisation	5	2	1	8
Religious conviction	4		2	6
Demand from friends in the country of origin	1	0	3	4
After a visit to the country of origin	2		1	3
Demand from municipality or city in Belgium	1	1		2
Demand from municipality or city in the country of origin	1			1
Demand from traditional NGO				0

The fact that many respondents commit to development cooperation on their own initiative because of the situation in the country of origin could be partly explained by the great frustration about the persistent underdevelopment of the country or region of origin discussed in the previous paragraph. The considerable effect of personal conviction is in line with the results for a number of statements. As mentioned earlier, the respondents generally agreed with statements saying that the weak have to help the poor and that everyone should take responsibility for the poor. They also feel that they can do something about the situation personally:

*“What motivated me personally was to be a role model for the young people in my immediate environment and far beyond. I wanted to show young people that dreams can come true if you do something about them. [...] I would like to offer*

*young people what I always wanted: a place outside my home where I feel at home, where I can go with any questions or ideas, to relax ...” (G2)*

TABLE 19: AVERAGE SCORES FOR STATEMENTS ACCORDING TO ETHNIC GROUP  
(1-4; 1 = STRONGLY DISAGREE AND 4 = STRONGLY AGREE)

Statements	Congolese (n = 44)	Ghanaian (n = 9)	Moroccan (n = 50)	Total (N = 103)
The strong have to help the weak in society.	3.36	3.56	3.62	3.50
Everyone has to take responsibility to do something for the poor in the world.	3.44	3.44	3.52	3.48
There is nothing I can do personally to reduce poverty in development countries.	1.98	2.13	2.07	2.03
Migrant can act as bridge builders between the government and NGOs in Belgium and the local partners in the country of origin.	3.47	3.00	3.33	3.38

The interviews also touched on the bridging role migrants can play in development policy and social policy and the socio-economic development of the region of origin in order to stop or regulate the immigration flows. This role is often an extra motivating factor for the commitment. This is also reflected in the survey. The respondents generally agreed to the statement “Migrants can act as bridge builders between the government and NGOs in Belgium and the local partners in the country of origin because they know the local context.”

A number of interviewees see their expertise in local customs and habits as a necessary property to make the projects they execute in Antwerp and their region of origin efficient: they know how they should work with the local population or people from their migrant community, they know the cultural sensitivities, they know the local social context and political structures, they have the necessary relations, they know what is going on ...

*“Migrants have another advantage: they know the terrain, they can easily contact their fellow-citizens there. They are someone people can confide in and they know the culture as well, because sometimes development aid workers suggest something that is completely at odds with the interests and culture of the people there. Migrants can play a big role in this respect.” (G20)*

*“The sub-Sahara organisations of ethnic minorities always thought that the people here don’t need the migrants: ‘They want everything for Congo without our opinion, but they know nothing about the Congolese mentality. We are of Congolese descent and we know all these realities. The people of these organisations don’t.’ There are*

*too many people who think they know, but they get it all wrong. [...] The migrants came here with their customs. We must first try to understand people's mentality before we can try to fight AIDS." (G15)*

They can use this socio-cultural expertise for development cooperation initiatives in the countries of origin, but also in projects with migrant communities in the North, as illustrated by an interviewee of an HIV/AIDS education programme in the above quote, or to solve a number of social problems in their community with the policy in an even broader sense (G1, G3, G7, G12, G16). Similarly, young active members use their expertise in the situation of youngsters to find ways to make third- and fourth-generation migrants more open to development cooperation.

*"I mainly try to help the organisation by doing something for young people every year. [...] I told my father: 'Do you want to raise awareness all over Antwerp? Then you need to organise an event. A sports event. It attracts young people and a big audience.' [...] That is how the younger migrants were introduced to the project. We made flyers for younger people. And we gradually informed younger people about the project. [...] At the first tournament, I told everybody: 'Tell all your second cousins.' But they answered: 'Come on, go nag at someone else.' In a manner of speaking. [...] But many young people now ask: 'And how is it going with that football tournament for Morocco?' " (G7)*

Firstly, it became very clear that most migrants feel that their socio-cultural expertise is of great added value to the success of the projects when they answered the question whether the projects would have a chance to succeed without the participation of the migrants.

*"The chance to succeed would be much smaller. [...] There would be so many formalities that take up so much time and money. [...] The jury allocating individual grants are a problem. They are all people without roots or experience. They feel that things that are credible in Africa are incorrect or not credible. And vice versa. Because it sounds logical in a European context, where punctuality matters and so on. But in Africa, it doesn't matter. There, you need manipulative intelligence and you also need negotiation skills." (G11)*

*"The same project would never succeed. I will be honest with you. You need to be very close to people. An NGO may start a water project or educational project, but a cooperation for people where they have to go and work? You really need to feel what people are really about. We had to visit very often to get the people's support. To sell our story. So I think that if a white person shows up there, even if he shows every respect and good will towards those people, he will still need to sell his story. Even just the language is a problem. Those goats will have been sold even before you get back." (G8)*

Secondly, some migrants hope that their activities have an impact on the immigration into this country. Improving the socio-economic development of the region of origin and local people's living standards may reduce their aspirations or needs to come to Belgium. They see this in strong connection with the fact that it is not always easy to survive in Belgium either and the difficulties they encountered during their integration process.

*"It is not that we are just trying to help our family or our supporters. We also want to convey a feeling to people like: 'Look, you can also work here, in your own country.' In a few years time, my plan is to take pictures of Moroccans who really have it bad here, who are living in poverty, doing illegal things, and so on. I want to show those pictures to people over there: 'Look, things aren't always like what you hear.' "* (G6)

*"We just have to give jobs and food to those people. Instead of bringing war, we simply bring bread to feed people. It doesn't take much... and instead of coming here, people can enjoy the bread there."* (G18)

For most interviewees it was the city of Antwerp's invitation to the migrant communities to participate in its activities in the South that convinced them to do something about their commitment or to strengthen and expand existing ad hoc development aid projects, but the city's invitation did not motivate people directly to become engaged in development. This commitment was already there before. The city's invitation was a nudge. It was the reason the actual organisation was turned into a non-profit organisation and it provided the financial resources to launch the projects. It also gave moral support and appreciation: someone was finally listening to the migrant communities.

*"We had already done similar projects in Morocco. Unofficially, we just raised money through private funds. [...] Then we made it official and filed the byelaws with the court. We did that in order to work together officially with partners such as the city of Antwerp."* (G1)

*"The grant from the city of Antwerp is nothing, but it motivated me. It showed me that the city of Antwerp was behind me. That those people are saying: 'Do something in your own country.'" (G11)*

In the migrant communities, the success story of one of the organisations' activities was an important reason why other organisations also set up projects.

*"Setting up the non-profit organisation was not a problem. My father knows how to deal with the paperwork. [...] But then you start the development cooperation. We were not aware of Eva or AROSA. Then we were introduced to Mohammed Bouziani of IMANE. He coached the team together with Fauzaya of IMaMS."* (G7)

*"IMANE has been active for ten years. The first few years were very low key, they missed some sort of purpose. That did not really make me want to engage in*

*anything myself. [...] Two years ago, Imane suddenly took off. A lot of major projects were set up. Subsidies came in through all sorts of channels. That really spurred us on: 'Wow. This is great. Perhaps we should do something as well.' It was the catalyst, really." (G6)*

*"Why the organisation took that decision? Many many activities were taking place. Also with schools, exchange programmes for pupils and so on. Finally, the moment had arrived to put the region on the map." (G1)*

#### **4.5 Development cooperation and integration**

Migrants' commitment to transnational solidarity and development cooperation is generally linked to integration in three ways (Gowricharn, 2010 & Perrin and Martiniello, 2011 & Lacroix, 2011 and Lacroix, 2009):

- It appears that the migrants who commit to development cooperation are the ones who are already well integrated. We already discussed this in the paragraph on the profile of migrants who engage in development cooperation.
- Commitment to development cooperation and transnational solidarity, including money and goods transfers, holds back integration as migrants stay focused on the country of origin.
- Participating in development cooperation improves the integration of migrants, so that they gain more access to the public space, they increase their network, they become more familiar with government services and they feel that their socio-cultural expertise is appreciated by the policymakers.

One of the key figures rejects the argument that the focus of migrants on their country of origin within their transnational activities stands in the way of their integration as follows:

*"These are people who are extremely well integrated: you arrived in a country, you integrated economically and socially, you know the system very well, you can enter into a partnership with the local institutions yourself. If you can do all that, surely you have to be very well integrated. [...] The migrant who responds to the city's offer and is a driving force behind it even. The migrant who pursues the city's policy in his country of origin. How integrated is that?" (S1)*

Interviews with the active members of organisations of ethnic minorities also show that most of them see themselves as being from Belgium, Flanders or Antwerp with a migration background in The Democratic Republic of Congo, Morocco or Ghana. They have lived here for several years or were born and raised here. Or as one interviewee put it beautifully:

*"There is only one kind of Belgian, you know. Not an African Belgian or a Flemish Belgian. But many Belgians also have a Ghanaian cultural background." (G11)*

The previous paragraphs have shown that people committed to development cooperation tend to have a high level of integration in society. They have positive contacts with public services. They act as a bridge between social service organisations (cf. “When there are any problems of that nature [language or socio-cultural barriers], they call me” (G12)). They have relatively stable jobs and family lives. They have a wide network of social contacts and contacts with other organisations such as traditional NGOs. However, it transpires that their commitment in development cooperation can even improve their integration further.

Firstly, many interviewees consider the city’s invitation to the migrant communities to participate in its activities as a form of appreciation of their socio-cultural expertise and as an acknowledgement of their inclusion. It also shows them that they are seen as fully-fledged citizens of Antwerp. In their study of transnational activities by Belgian migrants, Perin and Matiniello (2011) also found a positive impact of the commitment to transnational activities and increased confidence. Participants get the feeling that they had improved their social position both within the migrant community and Belgian society as a whole. Nevertheless, our interviews show that a lot depends on the success of the transnational activities.

Secondly, migrant communities’ cooperation and embedding in a wider network with the Antwerp University and College Association (AUHA) and the Institute for Tropical Medicine (ITM) offers the opportunity to forge yet more new contacts with bodies and individuals they would otherwise not meet and to talk with them about joint projects.

This is illustrated by the following statements:

*“The positive aspect: people come together, they integrate. They are no longer separate. There is cohesion. They get to know and appreciate each other’s cultures.” (G13)*

*“When we organised a conference or congress with IMaMS, we always tried to involve the Moroccan community. This has allowed us to make the university a more visible reality in the Moroccan community and even more so, a reality that is also destined for them.” (S4)*

It also appears that the migrants’ commitment to the city’s development cooperation department has also given them a chance to get to know other services provided by the city. One of the key figures stated that because development cooperation relies heavily on positive contributions by the migrants, it offers them a more accessible and inviting channel to get to know the city’s other activities, social programmes and study channels and also urges them to get in touch with the city’s more restrictive policy services, such as the diversity policy and the regulations for mosques.

*“To us the city is the development cooperation service. That is AROSA and Eva and now Katrien.” (G3)*

*“The starting point of our activities is very different. We rely very heavily on identity perception: ‘It is OK to be an Antwerpian as well as a Moroccan. It is OK to be an Antwerpian as well as Congolese.’ Many other services convey messages like: ‘Isn’t it about time you knew how to speak Dutch?’. So it is a very different approach. [...] It is a really positive approach. [...] For example, someone dealing with the mosque policy was facing a problem with a mosque in Borgerhout one day. I knew that a number of these people are in my group organising activities in the South. At a certain point I sat them at the table together: ‘Hey, talk to each other.’ So, at my request and because I know these people in a completely different way than he does, they met such a request. I’m not saying any miracles happened as a result, but they did make contact.”*

Thirdly, development cooperation can also promote the integration of migrants in a more general sense, for example by involving migrants in other social domains, such as education. Within the city of Antwerp’s activities, for example, we see that the involvement of one of the active members of the Moroccan organisations of ethnic minorities is clearly linked to the development cooperation project implemented in Morocco and the appreciation he receives at the school for his input of socio-cultural expertise.

*“I followed up on the twinning project. I felt it was important because my daughters go to school there. [...] To absorb the cultural differences. As organisations, we know what is important to those people. You should never lose sight of that. As an organisation, you really have information that is indispensable for such projects.”*  
(G1)

Finally, the commitment to development cooperation is sometimes a necessity to guarantee social cohesion in the migrant communities themselves and bridge the tension between the first-generation, older migrants focusing on the country of origin and the younger generations who are committed to tackle the problems they face in Antwerp, such as discrimination at work and problems at school. This is also reflected in the following quote of an interviewee talking about the younger generation’s plans to develop a social programme to help solve the problems they are facing as young Moroccans.

*“First we needed to come to an agreement with the first generation here: the second-generation youngsters and the first generation. The first generation in Antwerp weren’t really interested at first. They were relatively satisfied. [...] Their main concern was still in Morocco. And then they said: ‘Look, we would really like to help you with your activities here, on the condition that you pay some more attention to Morocco.’ ”* (G3)

According to some interviewees, transnational activities for development cooperation can bring together different generations, but the younger generations

must be involved to ensure that can be sustained in the long term and attract the permanent interest of younger people. This means that issues that concern them must be dealt with and these issues are mainly in the North. The potential of transnational development activities therefore lies in linking the activities in the South to well developed activities in the North that focus on issues faced by migrants in the host country. Two of the interviewees emphasised that the city of Antwerp should use this potential more by embedding the activities in the South into the integration policy more. They suggested enforcing criteria to organisations of ethnic minorities that participate in the city of Antwerp's activities in the South, such as the organisation of social projects in the North (homework classes, job fairs, projects on loitering teens) or cooperation with organisations that link their traditional development cooperation activities in the South to how youngsters experience their identity.

## 4.6 How is transnational solidarity approached?

### 4.6.1 Remittances


The survey shows that most respondents send money by money transfer. Particularly the Congolese use this channel. Taking money on visits to the country of origin or sending over money with family or friends who are visiting are popular channels. Other methods are much more rare. However, we do see greater diversity in the used channels with the Congolese respondents compared to the other two groups. Most goods are brought over on visits or are given to family or friends who are visiting. A remarkably high number of Congolese respondents send goods by container. This shipment method is almost non-existent with the Moroccan respondents.

It should again be noted that the costs of sending goods are sometimes very substantial, up to 30% of the value of the goods in question. The survey does not provide a clear picture of the costs of sending money.

### 4.6.2 Development cooperation initiatives

#### Topics organisations of ethnic minorities are engaged in in the South

GRAPH 7. TOPICS OF DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS



Organisations of ethnic minorities that are active in the field of development cooperation mainly concentrate on the topics of health (43 respondents) and education (32 respondents). Both topics (health and education) are also priority topics for the city of Antwerp's activities in the South. A quarter of organisations of ethnic minorities indicates that they also organise cultural activities as part of their work in the South. The Moroccan organisations tend to focus mainly on

education, the Congolese on healthcare. The latter is hardly surprising: healthcare is one of the central topics of the federal government's development policy in The Democratic Republic of Congo and the partnerships and projects of the Institute of Tropical Medicine in The Democratic Republic of Congo. As far as the Moroccan's community's choice of education is concerned, mainly migrants with a low educational level (no qualifications or a certificate of primary school, vocational or technical secondary education) find education important. Such migrants are mainly respondents from Moroccan descent. The interviews also showed that contrary to the more traditional development cooperation projects of the Congolese and Ghanaian community, which focus on education and healthcare, most initiatives in the Moroccan community mainly emphasise economic development and the establishment of cooperatives. The income from these then finances educational and healthcare projects. This interest in setting up cooperatives is very much linked to the emphasis on agriculture and cooperatives in the Moroccan government's policy, as explained by an interviewee:

*'The Moroccan government and even the king encourage people to set up organisations and cooperatives. As soon as you mention a cooperative or organisation to the government, you are welcomed with open arms. [...] 'People, go and set up your cooperatives. Unite, so that I can know what your needs are and support you.' (G6)*

The focus of organisations of ethnic minorities is very much in line with the topics of other Flemish fourth pillars. A study by De Bruyn and Huyse (2009) show that Flemish fourth pillar initiatives with activities in the South are mainly active in areas such as education and healthcare. However, it is quite different from the traditional topics of NGOs and bilateral and multilateral development organisations, such as human rights, women's rights, the environment and good governance. Fourth pillar organisations rarely include these topics in their initiatives, with the exception of institutionalised fourth pillars, such as unions.

The literature about migration and development often describes migrants as ideal bridge builders between the North and South. Their socio-cultural expertise increases the chances that a project succeeds. There is also a growing interest in the positive role migrants can play in order to put topics such as gender, human rights and democracy up for discussion. However, the survey and the interviews show that migrants should be presented in this role of bridge builders with great caution. Or, as one of the key figures put it:

*"You know that for certain topics, it is better not to work with these organisations of ethnic minorities, because it will become problematic for that group, even if they want to do it.*

*It is not easy on location. It may create a distance between them and the local target group. [...] Migrants are also not always regarded as locals. It depends on the period he has been away. That is sometimes underestimated here. [...] Young adults return to their country of origin. Here they always hear: ‘You’re Congolese, Congolese, Congolese.’ and there they hear: ‘Hé, les Belges.’ [...] For example, when I come into a village with a very innovative project, they will tell me: ‘Ha, you’ve changed. You want us to change with you. You are brainwashed and must go back.’ ” (S1)*

This is confirmed by the younger members of the organisations of ethnic minorities.

*“They won’t accept it, I think. Young guy, second or third generation ... Here they will accept it alright, but there are people outside the organisation who are critical already. Second generation, what do they know? And this and that. [...] Imagine the responded when a third-generation individual starts saying: ‘This is how it is going to happen and this and that.’ ” (G7)*

### Activities region and partners in development cooperation

Our survey shows that the development cooperation initiatives mainly take place in the family’s place of residence. The initiatives of respondents of Congolese origin mainly take place in the regions where friends live, but less so in their place of birth. The respondents of Moroccan origin work in their family’s home region, but also in the region where they are born. However, this information must be interpreted with caution, as the various answer categories are not mutually exclusive. This means that the place of birth and the family’s place of residence can be the same, for example.

TABLE 20. REGION WHERE DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES (DC) TAKE PLACE ACCORDING TO ETHNIC BACKGROUND (SEVERAL ANSWERS ARE POSSIBLE)

Activities region	Congolese (n = 33)	Ghanaian (n = 2)	Moroccan (n = 27)	Total (N = 62)
Place of birth	8	1	20	29
Family’s place of residence	17	1	19	37
Friends’ place of residence	13		7	20
Elsewhere	4	1	5	10

Although over a third of respondents of Congolese descent state that they take their initiatives in the region where their friends live as well, they do not tend to work together with friends. Congolese organisations of ethnic minorities firstly work with social organisations and secondly with local authorities. Moroccan organisations of ethnic minorities have family members as their most important partners with a considerable overlap with the areas of activity and friends are next.

Social organisations and local authorities only come in fourth place as possible partners for cooperation with Moroccan organisations of ethnic minorities.

TABLE 21: PARTNERS ORGANISATIONS WORK WITH FOR THEIR DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION INITIATIVES (DC) ACCORDING TO ETHNIC BACKGROUND (SEVERAL ANSWERS ARE POSSIBLE)

Partner in DC initiatives	Congolese (n = 33)	Ghanaian (n = 2)	Moroccan (n = 27)	Total (N = 62)
Family	4		20	24
Friends	5		15	20
Social organisations	25	2	13	40
Local authorities	10	1	13	24
Others	1		2	3

### Management of the development cooperation initiatives

The survey also shows that most organisations active in transnational development cooperation initiatives are democratically structured with strong participation by the members in Antwerp and the local partners in the South. The latter may be family members or social organisations. Particularly in Moroccan organisations, family in the country of origin can play an important part in the choice of topics they pursue and the activities they perform. Most interviewed members were active in organisations with 40 to 100 members, but with a smaller group of up to about 10 active members and board members taking the final decisions and implementing and following up the projects.

TABLE 22 WHO CHOOSES THE TOPICS PURSUED BY THE DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION INITIATIVE? (SEVERAL ANSWERS ARE POSSIBLE.)

Choice of topic	Congolese (n = 35)	Ghanaian (n = 7)	Moroccan (n = 27)	Total (N = 69)
Board of administration	25		19	44
All members in consultation	15	3	25	33
Social organisations in the country of origin	10		11	21
Family in country of origin	3		17	20
Leader	6		14	20
Founder	6		7	13
Governments in Belgium			13	13
Friends in the country of origin	2	1	9	12

TABLE 23: WHO CHOOSES THE ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION INITIATIVE?  
(SEVERAL ANSWERS ARE POSSIBLE)

Choice of activity	Congolese (n = 35)	Ghanaian (n = 7)	Moroccan (n = 28)	Total (N = 70)
Board of administration	27		21	48
All members in consultation	15	3	21	39
Social organisations in the country of origin	9	1	11	21
Family in the country of origin	3		12	20
Leader	4		15	20
Founder	1		13	13
Friends in the country of origin	3		4	7
Governments in Belgium			7	7

The follow-up of projects is an intensive activity with multiple or sometimes even daily contacts with the local partners by telephone or mobile. E-mails and Skype are used far less in general. Another study (Perrin and Martiniello, 2011 & De Bruyn and Develtere, 2008) shows that geographic proximity plays an important part in the follow-up of projects. Moroccan interviewees stated in the interviews that they travel to Morocco far more often for the projects they are implementing. Interviewees from Congolese and Ghanaian descent can travel to their country of origin only once a year or every other year due to lack of time or financial resources. In this context, the respondents indicate that it is important to have a local representative who can follow up the projects.

Although the participation of the local population in the development and implementation of the project is seen as essential, the final responsibility and decisions still lie mainly with the migrants in the North. They are accountable to the other partners in the network and the donors. Many active members of the organisations of ethnic minorities participating in the city of Antwerp's activities in the South emphasise that they sometimes struggle with the city's bureaucratic procedures and project requirements. As mentioned already, they are not used to setting up files to apply for subsidies or justify projects. It also takes a lot of time to obtain all the necessary invoices and paperwork from the local partners, particularly when there are no local representatives and frequent visits to the partners for follow-up is impossible.

On the one hand, they can solve this with the knowledge they have of the local context and the contacts they have: they know how to approach things locally and they have the necessary "manipulative intelligence" (G11). On the other hand, this

jeopardises the requirements and ideals upheld by the donors and other actors in the development cooperation market. In practice, it is not always possible to obtain receipts for everything, to avoid bribery, to purchase materials locally or to save on transport costs by delegating more responsibilities to local partners. This is also emphasised by one of the key figures:

*“In Congo the institutional framework is very difficult. The Congolese organisations engaging in development cooperation, you notice: X of organisation Y, she has been living here for thirty years and her way of thinking is totally different than someone from organisation V or W. They are newer ... They do things differently. Usually the short history that brought them here determines how they have to deal with institutions. They will make more concessions to institutions than X. V and W may be able to explain a project very well, but they will make concessions locally to the poor institutional framework.” (S1)*

It was found that most organisation members do not like working with the local political institutions. To them, it is a great advantage that the city of Antwerp’s activities in the south focuses particularly on organisations of ethnic minorities that can work at grassroots level with local communities. The political institutions complicate and delay projects and sometimes make transnational development cooperation initiatives impossible.

*“The goats project would have been impossible without the city of Antwerp. Fauzaya has many contacts in Morocco and that opened a lot of doors for us. [...] You have to understand: every village has a leader, a mayor, a regional leader. The next thing you hear is: ‘Uh oh, we have the Flemish coming to Morocco. Uh oh, the medicines are coming.’ And then my father has to go over there to justify this four times over. A stamp from Fauzaya or the consulate helps, as Fauzaya is in close contact with the consulate in Morocco.” (G6)*

Strategic key figures in the network of the city of Antwerp’s activities in the South can therefore play an important part in the success of projects. Two interviewees of a Congolese background suggested that the operation of organisations of ethnic minorities in the Democratic Republic of Congo could be improved by establishing a type of Flanders or Antwerp House in Kinshasa similar to the house that was established by the city of Brussels there. As a meeting place, it could attract local attention to the migrants’ transnational activities and have an impact on the politicians. The advantages of promoting more institutional cooperation with local authorities in the regions where the migrants are active were discussed with the key figures. In general there was a consensus that such cooperation can be positive because it allows the city to make efforts to improve the local institutional structure, which makes local activities easier for migrants. However, such institutional cooperation requires huge commitment from the city of Antwerp and the existing projects implemented by migrants as part of the city of Antwerp’s

activities in the South are too context specific. As a result of this, the city would have to set up 20 city partnerships as it were.

#### **Cooperation with the actors of the city of Antwerp network (AUHA and ITM)**

The organisations of ethnic minorities members generally applaud the network the city developed with AUHA and ITM. As mentioned earlier, it is a forum for integration, exchanging experiences, entering into dialogue and appreciating each other's culture.

In general, the exchanges of nursing or teaching students are also welcomed. They can contribute content to the projects. People in the country of origin are also charmed by the fact that their country is visited by foreign students. Still, the interviews reveal that organising such exchanges is time consuming and involves a lot of work. Most see the exchanges as an external condition for the city of Antwerp's support and they have to make an extra effort in this respect on top of the time they spend following up the actual development projects. This seems to cause tension between the partners even, because the commitment and responsibilities for these 'side activities' are being shifted from one partner to the other. Some also feel that the students in question are poorly prepared and not open enough for the socio-cultural reality they encounter. They tend to focus on transferring their knowledge too much, rather than learning from local expertise.

#### **Cooperation with other actors**

Most organisations of ethnic minorities are embedded in a network with local, national and international contacts with other socio-cultural organisations, research institutes, individual NGOs, umbrella organisations, international organisations and forums. The contact they maintain with these actors tends to be instrumental and ranges from obtaining subsidies, organising projects together to cooperation with NGOs to provide tax certificates to the donating members of the community.

One striking aspect is the mutual commitment within the Congolese community: members of Congolese organisations of ethnic minorities sit on each other's boards. One interviewed member of an organisation not directly involved in the city of Antwerp's activities in the South did issue a warning that this situation is at risk of reducing the city's cooperation with the Congolese community in Antwerp to a small group of active first-generation Congolese who do not necessarily represent the entire Congolese community in Antwerp.

The Ghanaian and Moroccan organisations do not tend to participate as much in each other's administrative bodies, but there is close informal contact during which information and experiences are exchanged. The interviews also show that the interviewed Moroccan organisations of ethnic minorities are mainly locally oriented and are often based on family and community networks (although more and more

contacts now transcend the family context and other organisations are contacted as well), whereas the Ghanaians and Congolese are committed to national, regional or even international organisations. The study by Perrin and Martiniello (2011) produced similar findings.

We see that Ghanaian organisations are active in different places in Ghana. One of the interviewed leaders said that this is because the groups participating in the city of Antwerp's activities in the South are socio-cultural organisations. These are organisations that unite Ghanaians based on their social and cultural ties with their community. As a result, different socio-cultural groups are represented within the Ghanaian community. Making them work together in one region is difficult and would undermine their socio-cultural expertise that they can use. The interviews also reveal the important, more formal role the Ghana Council plays to coordinate and unite the Ghanaian organisations for the city of Antwerp's activities in the South.

## 5. Conclusions & recommendations

Every year, migrants send money and goods to their family and friends in their country of origin for various purposes. In addition to these individual initiatives, more and more organisations of ethnic minorities are developing small-scale projects to support local communities in the country of origin. Many of these transnational activities are closely linked to development cooperation.

About four years ago, the city of Antwerp started to reform its activities in the South drastically within its development cooperation policy, from institutional support of twin towns through city-to-city cooperation, which involved several city departments and institutions, to structural support for development cooperation projects in The Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana and Morocco. In its governmental agreement for 2007-2012, the city committed itself to examine whether it could use part of its resources for development cooperation in countries from where there are large migrant communities living in Antwerp. When the city-to-city cooperation with Paramaribo finished in 2009, Antwerp entered into an experimental stage of thematic educational and healthcare activities in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana and Morocco through networks of organisations of ethnic minorities from the countries in question, educational and research facilities (AUHA and ITM) and other interested organisations in Antwerp. The various organisations of ethnic minorities were invited to meeting events where the new policy vision was presented. Then project groups were established with the interested organisations and educational and research facilities for each country in order to plan the projects. The projects then actually started in late 2010.

The city plays three roles: it acts as a matchmaker within the network, a channel of subsidies and a capacity builder/coach. In 2012 a status report was created based on a written survey, interviews with key figures and members of organisations of ethnic minorities<sup>7</sup>. This report contains information about the profile of the people involved, the motivation for their commitment, their activities and the way they experience their cooperation with the city and other actors.

### 5.1 Profile

It is not easy to create a well-defined profile for the group engaging in remittances and development cooperation initiatives in the country of origin. Migrant communities are not homogenous groups. They consist of first and subsequent generations and people who immigrated for various reasons (employment, marriage, political reasons ...). Yet based on our findings, we can outline the profile of the people in the three abovementioned communities who are involved in these activities and the reasons for their commitment.

Interviews with representatives of the three communities show that most migrants (to a lesser extent younger second- and third-generation migrants) are involved

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<sup>7</sup> Due to the small number of respondents from the Ghanaian community, the results for this community must be considered with some caution.

in some form of transnational solidarity. Some send money and goods to family, others are engaged in an individual, small-scale project in their country of origin and yet others raise funds to support schools or social organisations in their region of birth. A limited group of migrants is committed to organised, more large-scale initiatives of development cooperation within the structure of an organisation.

The survey mainly shows that remittances are largely sent by older migrants, who tend to be of the first generation. Young people indicate that they rarely send money or goods, as they are more focused on society here and also experience a less direct social and emotional bond with the country of origin compared to their parents. Young people's commitment is different from their parents. They do not always consider these activities as development cooperation, even if they do take place in the country of origin. Particularly children from leaders of organisations of ethnic minorities that are active in the South contribute to initiatives taken by their parents. They raise funds for the project through the organisation they belong to (sports club, organisation of ethnic minorities, cultural organisation ...) and they help their parents with administrative tasks.

There are more men than women who report regularly sending money or goods to their country of origin or commitment to development cooperation. However, the analysis of the interviews teaches us that women are involved in transnational activities, but their roles are more 'behind the scenes'. Women are committed to projects of a smaller scale, ad hoc development aid and raising funds. Male respondents do appreciate the women's input and recognise its positive effect on the organisation's operation.

The majority of people who say they send remittances and commit to development cooperation have a life partner and children. Most also have jobs.

If we look at the specific profile of the leaders of organisations, we can add that they are often in a position that offers a great deal of flexibility, which allows them to commit themselves voluntarily to the organisation. They are very much socially embedded and are active in several networks. They are also well aware of the structures of city government.

## 5.2 Support for transnational activities

Our study has shown that a substantial proportion of people in the diaspora in a city like Antwerp send remittances to their country of origin. Our data also shows that the migrants in Antwerp also engage in transnational activities that go well beyond sending money and goods. Particularly organisations of ethnic minorities from sub-Saharan Africa include 'North-South cooperation' in their byelaws as an essential element of their activities. For Moroccan organisations of ethnic minorities, it is a relatively new concept, but here as well there seems to be an increase in activities aimed at specific regions of the country of origin. Although the nature of these activities may lead us to consider them as a type of development cooperation, the people involved do not necessarily see their commitment as such. To them, it is a kind of social obligation, a form of loyalty towards the country of origin, or in case of a limited group of second-generation young people of Moroccan origin, a commitment for religious reasons. Whatever the reasons for the initiatives, we are interested in the extent of the support within people's own migrant community, as the community's support affects the sustainability of the project.

Based on our research, we see that projects of organisations within the Moroccan community enjoy broad support from their own community, whereas in the Congolese community we saw more individual initiatives. The number of projects in the Ghanaian community is limited compared to the other two communities, but we do notice considerable potential support. The umbrella organisation Ghana Council is trying to align the activities of the Ghanaian organisations. Compared to the projects of Congolese or Ghanaian organisations, projects organised by the Moroccan organisations seem more self-sufficient. The health and education projects of the Moroccan organisations are funded by the cooperatives that were set up with the city of Antwerp's financial support. The first two communities are more in need of financial support from the city of Antwerp (or other donors) in order to continue their activities. This is less the case for projects of the Moroccan community.

Support from second and subsequent generations for development cooperation in the country of origin also seems rather limited. However, this does not mean that young people are not interested in transnational solidarity activities. They are simply more focused on activities in Antwerp than in the country of origin.

Like any other type of volunteering, the initiatives of people in the diaspora supporting the country of origin require time, money and a lot of energy. Even more so than the activities organised by organisations of ethnic minorities in Antwerp, these commitments require a high level of flexibility from the people taking the initiative. It requires fund raising efforts in the North, the mobilisation of people, file submissions in case subsidies are needed and regular travel to the country of origin. The preparation, implementation and follow-up of transnational

projects and the cooperation with the city of Antwerp's development cooperation department is a labour-intensive process for the volunteers of the organisations of ethnic minorities. The leaders of projects focusing on the country of origin are therefore mainly people in flexible jobs or employment situations that allow sufficient time for other activities. Although this cooperation is experienced as positive, actually putting in the work is not always straightforward for everyone. The combination with a full-time job and family life is not easy. The lack of concrete commitment by some must therefore not be interpreted as lack of interest, but more as a potential that could be tapped into under more favourable circumstances.

### **5.3 Transnational activities in the South to promote social cohesion in the North**

As mentioned earlier in the report, critics say that migrants supporting their country of origin are an indication of too much focus on the old country and not enough on the country where migrants live. However, this is not necessarily true. Our study shows that commitment in development cooperation certainly does not mean that the person involved only focuses on the country of origin. In fact, most people involved in initiatives feel that they are Flemish, Belgians and Antwerpians. The initiatives for development cooperation are also part of social organisations with socially strong leaders who take on an integrating role in the community. A number of them even act as bridge builders within the community and towards society as a whole.

It is precisely those persons who are highly integrated and well informed of what goes on in Flanders who develop successful initiatives. The setup of a project and subsidies file requires a minimum of knowledge of the usual procedures. Those who are familiar with these are obviously more likely to succeed.

It would be premature to deduct from our findings that sending money and goods to the country of origin and setting up development projects in the South generally has a positive impact on integration and social cohesion in the city. However, we do see some modest positive trends emerging. Earlier in this report, we illustrated how a development project was used to bridge the gap between first- and second-generation migrants. We also saw that migrants' commitment to development cooperation allows them to express their transnational identity. They can be Flemish, Belgian and Antwerpian as well as Congolese, Ghanaian or Moroccan. Another important conclusion of our report is that cooperation between organisations of ethnic minorities, the city of Antwerp's development cooperation department and other actors in the network of activities in the South has a positive effect on the relationships between the city and these organisations.

## 5.4 The city as matchmaker?

As mentioned earlier, the organisations of ethnic minorities the development cooperation department works with are based on volunteer work. They do not necessarily have the expertise, the (technical/administrative) competencies and the terminology specific to the official development cooperation circuit. This situation means that they feel inferior to the other actors. Nevertheless we should not forget that volunteers are driven by passion and are often extremely motivated. They spend a lot of their free time to organisations, sometimes at the expense of other social and family contacts. They also have specific expertise in the socio-cultural customs of the country of origin and they are extremely suitable as bridge builders. It is clear that the cooperation between the city and the organisations led to the professionalisation of projects and a broadening of the network of organisations of ethnic minorities. A good example of this is the cooperation with AUHA and ITM. The policy conversion in 2007 clearly acknowledged the organisations of ethnic minorities, their specific expertise in the country of origin and their bridging role between the North and the South. We also note that the cooperation between the organisations of ethnic minorities and the development cooperation department of the city of Antwerp has a positive effect on the relationships between the city and these organisations. The involved organisations of ethnic minorities themselves also experience the development cooperation policy of the city as favourable and supportive of their activities. We are therefore pleased to conclude this report with a number of recommendations that can perpetuate the current cooperation between the city and the organisations of ethnic minorities.

## 5.5 Recommendations

As far as the **profile of the individuals active in development cooperation** is concerned, the study leads us to believe that not everyone is committed in the same way. This is not a problem as such for the operation of the organisations. If the city wants to better meet the various needs of the organisations, the development cooperation department will have to focus its support and awareness campaigns more on the specific needs and areas for improvement for every community. More tailor-made activities will also broaden the support in every community. In order to consolidate the support of the organisations of ethnic minorities, **a consensus must also be reached** with these organisations about the following:

- the extent of the necessity to **professionalise** the development cooperation operations of organisations of ethnic minorities or to sustain **volunteer work**;
- administrative requirements versus simplification.

Based on the findings of this report, it is difficult to say whether the activities in the South should be expanded to other countries and topics. However, as the current policy for the activities in the South does not have a long tradition, horizontal (towards more communities) and content **broadening** must be considered with the necessary caution. Without **extra resources** such as human capital, content expertise and funding, further expansion will jeopardise the further expansion of the results that have been achieved so far.

**In order to strengthen its role as matchmaker**, the city can:

- **organise information sessions about the possibilities of subsidies**, and possibly also provide information about other financing channels.
- work together with the regional or federal government (depending on the distribution of competence in this matter) in order to establish to what extent this informal aid to the country of origin can be included in official development cooperation (fourth-pillar initiatives). Supportive tax and other cost-saving measures can be sought for organisations of ethnic minorities as well (for sending money and goods, for example) - this is now already the case for NGOs.
- act as a **facilitator** between **companies/sponsors** and **organisations of ethnic minorities**.

Better **coordination** of the **integration policy** and the **development cooperation department** is advisable for various reasons. This will allow full use of the potential trust between the key figures and their supporters on the one hand, and the city and other partners on the other hand. Organisations of ethnic minorities active in the South usually also have activities aimed at living in our country. However, it is unclear to what extent the organisations supported by the development cooperation department are also involved in the city's integration policy. The connection between the departments (the development cooperation department and the departments focusing on integration) could increase support, because women and young people who focus more on social activities in Antwerp can be involved more in activities focusing on the South, for example. Older people, who tend to be committed mostly to activities in the country of origin, could also be asked to contribute to social activities in Antwerp. Concrete proposals include:

- Continue to invite organisations of ethnic minorities to relevant **training sessions** of other city departments.
- Reach out to the city's **youth policy** or the **education policy** for the development of education projects at schools or youth organisations.
- Share **good practices** of organisations of ethnic minorities in the country of origin through the channels of the integration policy.
- Set up **exchanges** between groups of women/young people (possibly of organisations of ethnic minorities) in the North and in the country of **origin**.

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A city like Antwerp is not an island. It is part of a global society and was able to grow thanks to its international contacts. The international port of Antwerp has always been a great attraction and gateway to faraway countries and foreign cultures.

About 167 nationalities have been registered in Antwerp. Most of them stay in contact with family in their country of origin. More and more organisations of ethnic minorities see their transnational identity as an opportunity to support initiatives in their country of origin. These initiatives are evolving from a rather individual form of solidarity towards initiatives closely related to development cooperation.

With this study, we wanted to gain an understanding of the role of the diaspora in Antwerp in development cooperation in Congo, Ghana en Morocco. Based on a survey and interviews with key figures and members of organisations of ethnic minorities in Antwerp, we examined:

- the profile of these organisations;
- the motives of their commitment towards development cooperation;
- the impact of this commitment on their own lives in Antwerp;
- the possibilities of further support from the city of Antwerp to these organisations.

